Threat Actors Subscribe To Patches

Cofense IntelligenceTM has analyzed a relatively new malware known as Alpha Keylogger, which appears to be part of a growing trend among threat actors to use subscription-based malware that doesn’t deliver on its original promises. Part of the reason behind this trend is that threat actors are more frequently releasing malware builders that are incomplete and still under development, then charging users a subscription fee to have the builder updated with a “patch.” This practice has become increasingly common with enterprise software as well as video games, so it is not surprising to see the trend in the criminal underworld. The patching subscription model may be a burden to some enterprise environments, but its underworld equivalent is a significant boon to law enforcement and network defenders. Personnel tasked with combating nefarious software can leverage the patching and licensing mechanisms of subscription-based malware to track down distributors.  

The Reasons Behind The Model 

Much like with legitimate software, threat actors decide what malware to buy based on several factors including the reviews, price, type (such as a keylogger or a Remote Access Tool (RAT), developer, and marketing. However, to make money in this competitive environment, malware developers need to take different approaches, such as: 

  • Sell the product for much less than similar malware. 
  • Give the product away. While this strategy may appear to be a good deal, malware developers have been known to include a back door enabling them to steal their “customer’s” stolen data.  
  • Base the new malware on a pre-existing and well-known malware, such as WSH RAT. As discussed in a previous CofenseTM report, the developers of this RAT billed it as a “new” RAT with advanced features and offered it at a starting subscription price of only $50 per month. However, in reality, WSH RAT wasn’t new at all and was a variant of the pre-existing and long-lived Houdini Worm with some minor feature improvements. 
  • Focus on spending heavily on marketing. While concentrating on marketing can be profitable, it is likely the reason that some malware perceived as the “next big threat” disappears shortly after making headlines – probably because the budget was spent mainly on marketing rather than development.  

Possibly taking a lesson from legitimate software companies and the frequent failure of the options mentioned above, more and more malware developers have started to adopt the patching subscription model. This model allows them to take the middle road, charging relatively smaller subscriptions (in the case of Alpha Keylogger, $13 per month) while claiming to deliver more and being able to delay feature release.  

The glut of available products, however, often leads malware developers to over-promise on features for which they then must include a basic test or example of in their code. Expedited or rushed releases of the software lead to buggy code, in turn hurting the credibility of malware authors. For instance, Alpha Keylogger claims to have a suite of features including the ability to exfiltrate data over email, FTP, or via the API of the messaging company Telegram. In practice, customers (threat actors) can choose FTP or email, and the keylogger will still attempt to exfiltrate information via Telegram API even when the configuration data is blank. This attempt creates a distinct and apparent HTTPS request on infected machines that do not successfully exfiltrate data and can be used to help identify this malware in network traffic. 

Why Network Defenders Like Updates 

The “bug” in Alpha Keylogger that causes extraneous network traffic could allow network defenders to look for such malformed URLs as signs of malicious activity despite the involvement of a legitimate domain. Even intentional updates on the part of malware developers can assist network defenders. An example of this is when the Geodo/Emotet botnet began distributing a new module. The nature of this deployment allowed Cofense to correctly assess and prepare for the delivery of more sophisticated phishing emails. If the changes had been made by a new family of malware rather than as part of an update that Cofense was looking for, it would have been more challenging to prepare. 

Why Law Enforcement Likes Licensing 

The bugs and hints provided via malware updates are helpful to network defenders, but the licensing system behind these updates can be even more useful to law enforcement. Many RATs store the license key of the individual that purchased the malware builder as a registry entry on infected computers. Depending on the method used to obtain this license key, the payment information may be associated with the key even if it is not directly associated with the individual who purchased the key. Subsequentially, a receipt of some sort may be sent to an account that is accessed by the threat actor who bought the license key. Under the right circumstances, a license key saved as a registry entry on a victims computer could be linked with a receipt in a threat actor’s inbox, attributing them to the attack. Law enforcement organizations could then build a case using this link and additional information, such as the IP address used to access the inbox. 

Applicability In Enterprise Environments 

Organizations with enterprise-scale infrastructure often encounter “shadow IT” software or malware applications that can be difficult to spot and eradicate. The licensing mechanisms found in subscription-based malware—to include potential receipts in email—can be used by threat hunters to identify insider threats. Organizations impacted by malware akin to Alpha Keylogger can weed out further infections by leveraging incident response tools and YARA rules (such as the ones provided by Cofense IntelligenceTM) which inspect registry keys. Furthermore, the potential for attribution and legal action against a threat actor through license tracking provides large corporations with enhanced defensive capabilities. 

Table 1: Malware Artifacts 

Filename  MD5 
Company Profile.doc  b46396f32742da9162300efc1820abb3 
bukak.exe  3ceb85bcd9d123fc0d75aefade801568 

 

Table 2: Network IOCs 

IOC 
biz[@]Bootglobal[.]com 
kamonubilel[@]gmail[.]com 
hxxp://ktkingtiger[.]com/bukak[.]exe 

 

 

HOW COFENSE CAN HELP 

Cofense Intelligence processes and analyzes millions of emails and malware samples each day, providing a view of emerging phishing and malware threats. 

The Cofense Phishing Defense CenterTM identifies active phishing attacks in enterprise environments. Learn how our dedicated experts provide actionable intelligence to stop phishing threats. 

Condition end users to be resilient to ransomware and other attacks with Cofense PhishMeTM.  It includes a variety of ransomware templates to help users recognize the threat. Empower users to report phishing emails with one click using Cofense ReporterTM. 

Quickly turn user reported emails into actionable intelligence with Cofense TriageTM. Reduce exposure time by rapidly quarantining threats with Cofense VisionTM. 

Attackers do their research. Every SaaS platform you use is an opportunity for attackers to exploit it. Understand what SaaS applications are configured for your domains—do YOUR research with Cofense CloudSeekeTM. 

Thanks to our unique perspective, no one knows more about current REAL phishing threats than Cofense. To raise your understanding, read the 2019 Phishing Threat & Malware Review. 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.  

Double Duty: Dridex Banking Malware Delivered with RMS RAT

Cofense IntelligenceTM analyzes millions of emails and malware samples each day to alert organizations to emerging phishing threats. Thanks to our expansive view of the threat landscape, we recently were able to discover and investigate a campaign impersonating eFax that appeared to have an attached Microsoft Word document. The attachment was a .zip archive which contained a .xls Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. This spreadsheet included an Office macro which, when enabled, was used to download and execute two malicious executables: samples of Dridex and Remote Manipulator System Remote Access Tool (RMS RAT).

What’s notable: By delivering a banking trojan and a RAT, the threat actors are able to use the banking trojan purely for credential stealing via browsers and use the RAT for more complex management of the infected computer. Dridex may be able to handle some of the machine management tasks, but by using RMS RAT and Dridex for separate purposes threat actors can more efficiently accomplish their tasks. And having both available provides a backup communication channel in case one of the malware families is detected and removed.

RMS RAT Features

RMS RAT is a legitimate remote access tool appropriated for malicious use by threat actors. RMS RAT has a large number of features that include logging keystrokes, recording from the webcam or microphone, transferring files, and manipulating Windows Task Manager and other Windows utilities. This multi-featured tool allows for significant control of a compromised computer as well as multiple methods of information gathering. Due to its legitimate origins and usage of legitimate components, not all endpoint protection suites will immediately detect this tool as malicious, which allows threat actors more time to establish a foothold in the infrastructure.

Dridex Web Injects

Banking trojans often target a large number of websites and use different kinds of scripts for different targets. Some banking trojans will even share the same scripts and targets with other banking trojans. When a victim on an infected machine visits one of the targeted websites in an internet browser, the script will be “injected” into the browser. This allows the threat actor to steal information entered, redirect traffic, bypass multi-factor authentication, and even provide additional “security questions” to obtain information from the victim. In this case, the web injects used by Dridex were unusual because of both the large number of possible web inject scripts and the fact that some of the web injects were labeled as being from the Zeus banking trojan.

There are three types of web injects used in this case. The first type is used to hide or display content on certain web pages, making it possible to insert additional requests for personal questions used to verify banking accounts. The second type monitors the URLs visited by the browser and downloads additional files; the web injects labeled as Zeus fall in this category. Both of these web injects come hard coded into the original malicious binary. The third type of web inject is downloaded from a remote host and often has more capabilities, including greater information-gathering capacity.

Web injects in this sample of Dridex target a variety of websites:

  • The first set targets crypto currency websites such as coinbase[.]com and banking websites such as hsbc[.]co[.]uk and synovus[.]com. The web injects for these targets are downloaded from the same command and control location, 144[.]76[.]111[.]43.
  • A second set of web injects targets e-commerce websites, including paypal[.]com and bestbuy[.]com, and is sourced from a different location: akamai-static5[.]online. The threat actor’s use of this particular domain name is clever because it is similar enough to an Akamai network domain name that the domain might not be reported because it looks legitimate.
  • The final set of web injects are tagged as “Zeus” injects. The use of these injects is particularly unusual because several of the targeted websites overlap with those in other web injects, such as paypal[.]com and amazon[.]com.

By using multiple types of web injects, and in some cases duplicating websites of other web injects, the threat actors have a wide variety of possible targets at their disposal. Using both old and new web injects can also help threat actors target information even when the structure of the webpages’ URL has changed over time.

Threat Results and a Look Ahead:

The dual-pronged attack in this case provided the threat actors with multiple methods of compromise, access to data, and some resistance to traditional endpoint protections. RMS RAT provided remote access, key logging, and credential stealing. And using different types of web injects enabled threat actors to utilize some of the features of Zeus to improve the capabilities of Dridex. Each different type of web inject also made use of a different command and control location to provide information, which can help make the threat actor’s infrastructure more resilient.

Knowing all of the possible threats in combination rather than those seen individually can help organizations prepare for and defend against threats. Training employees to spot and report possible phishing messages can help stop malware from making it to an endpoint and prevent threat actors from ever establishing a foothold.

Learn More

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Appendix:

Table 1: List of potential web inject source

Web Inject Sources
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/amex_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/bbt_biz_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/bbt_corp_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/bmo_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/bnycash_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/bremer_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/pnc_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/scotiabank_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/tdbank_tdetreasury_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/510/tiquani_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/amama_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/amunba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/atonbu_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/bacana_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/bahaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/bokafi_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/bomobo_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/buliba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/camaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/camaci_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/camana_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/cibaca_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/cobaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/cobuba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/emriba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/ewaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/facosa_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/famaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/finiba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/fumaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/hacaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/hasaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/hasaba_uk_pers_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/iboaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/inruba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/irisoba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/katata_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/lakala_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/lemiba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/madaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/magaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/matawa_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/mecoma_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/moboma_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/osv_cetiba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/osv_fasaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/osv_sabatu_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/osv_tobipu_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/pawaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/peniba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/pocoba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/povaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/rabaca2_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/rabaca_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/rasaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/satara_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/secaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/sigaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/socoba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/synova_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/tadaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/todoba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/ubatra_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/unbaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/wabaca_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/appleadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/bestbuyadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/costcoadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/ebayadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/neweggadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/ppadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/samsclubadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/walmartadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://bustheza[.]com/lob[.]php
hxxps://cachejs[.]com/lob[.]php
hxxps://46[.]105[.]131[.]77:443/B88U86giIPyD55RK/
hxxps://46[.]105[.]131[.]77:443/ehf9i7ywh5kdyu50/
hxxps://46[.]105[.]131[.]77:443/xobj6j20x84lhk3x/

Table 2: Command and control hosts (C2)

RMS RAT C2
217[.]12[.]201[.]159:5655
Dridex C2
hxxps://71[.]217[.]15[.]111:443/
hxxps://97[.]76[.]245[.]131:443/
hxxps://24[.]40[.]243[.]66:443/
hxxps://159[.]69[.]89[.]90:3389/
hxxps://159[.]89[.]179[.]87:3389/
hxxps://62[.]210[.]26[.]206:3389/

Table 3: Payload locations

Office Macro Payloads
hxxp://topdalescotty[.]top/filexxx/wiskkk[.]exe
hxxp://topdalescotty[.]top/filexxx/wotam[.]exe

 

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Using Windows 10? It’s Becoming a Phishing Target

CISO Summary

Cofense IntelligenceTM has recently seen a complex phishing campaign that delivers a simple payload, FormGrabber keylogger malware. The targets are Windows 10 operating systems running Windows Anti-malware Scan Interface (AMSI). The phishing emails deliver a Microsoft Excel Worksheet containing a MS Word macro that initiates infection.

What’s notable: threat actors are hitting Windows 10 instead of Windows 7, a more common target. Expect to see greater abuse heaped on the newer version as more businesses adopt it. No one aspect of this campaign is novel, but the attackers easily assembled a complex infection chain using multiple obfuscation and evasion techniques—another sign of how quickly criminals innovate when motivated.

 Full Details

Cofense Intelligence recently observed a campaign where threat actors targeted Windows 10 operating systems and used a complex multi-stage campaign to deliver the relatively simple FormGrabber keylogger. The emails utilized a Microsoft Office Excel Worksheet with an Office Word macro to initiate the infection. If macros were enabled, this macro would execute a PowerShell script that compiled embedded C# code content into a .NET dll. The .NET dll was loaded as a PowerShell module that then downloaded and executed the FormGrabber keylogger. The code used in the PowerShell module specifically targets Windows 10 computers which have the Windows Anti-malware Scan Interface (AMSI) installed.

Initiation

Each email identified within this campaign had two attachments: the first was a Microsoft Office Excel Worksheet, the second was an RTF document. This RTF document contained five embedded copies of the same Excel Worksheet, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Copies of the same embedded Worksheet object

When the document is opened, the victim is prompted five times (once for each of the embedded worksheets) to enable macros. After all the prompts have been responded to, the RTF document will be opened. The method used to embed the worksheet objects into the RTF document requires that the worksheet objects be displayed in some form or fashion. In most cases, threat actors will carefully attempt to hide the object to avoid tipping off victims. As shown in Figure 2, in this case the threat actors simply let the default primary worksheet display in the footer section of the document.

Figure 2: The image displayed in the footer of the RTF document

Here the threat actors repurposed a legitimate example worksheet from Carnegie Mellon University to hide malicious content. The file size and macro run by the attached and embedded Excel worksheets are different, however the end result and final payload location are the same, indicating that the two attachments were likely used for redundancy.

Worksheets

Automated systems often examine the macros in documents in an attempt to determine their intentions. Even if the macro is encoded or obfuscated, modern anti-virus should be capable of reversing the changes or at least detecting key malicious components without running the macro. The macros in these worksheets used a simple technique that may have allowed the threat actors to avoid some automated defenses, crafting a macro that decoded content stored in a cell on a seemingly empty page of the worksheet, as shown in Figure 3. Note that the macro (one line of which appears at the top of the image) references cell “J106” on sheet “RPNLU.” All cells in sheet “RPNLU” appear to be empty and the default page view has cell “J106” out of view, ensuring that even if manually opened, the only obvious discrepancy between the original legitimate worksheet and the malicious one is the addition of the sheet “RPNLU.”

Figure 3: Disguised data used by macro (top of image)

Once decrypted, this macro then launches a PowerShell process which contains another subsection of encrypted data, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Second stage of the PowerShell script

This PowerShell command takes the encrypted content and decrypts it into C# code, which is then compiled into a .NET dll and loaded as a PowerShell module.

Bypassing

The compilation and multiple layers of encryption involved in this process are all used to “bypass” AMSI. AMSI is a Windows 10 exclusive feature intended to help detect and prevent scripts and “fileless threats.” In order to “bypass” AMSI, the threat actors avoid downloading files and perform other obviously malicious activity in the code that runs in the PowerShell console. Instead they focus only on disabling AMSI by adjusting where it looks for malicious content. The code used for this is similar and almost identical in some places to the proof of concept described in this blog post. Once AMSI is properly disabled, the threat actors then load in the C# code including the explicitly malicious code compiled in a .NET dll as a PowerShell module. A relevant portion of this code can be seen in Figure 5.

Figure 5: A modified version of the original POC code to bypass AMSI

Results and a Look Ahead

Threat actors used a complex infection chain that specifically targeted a key component of Windows 10 operating systems, rather than the more common Windows 7-focused malware, to deliver FormGrabber keylogger. As more businesses switch to the Windows 10 operating system, threat actors, like the ones seen here, can be expected to switch their targets to Windows 10 as well. Although none of the techniques used in this campaign were particularly novel, the fact that it utilized multiple obfuscation and evasion techniques and was so easily assembled from already created work indicates how quickly and significantly threat actors can improve, given the proper impetus. As is usually the case when it comes to vulnerabilities in key components, a patch to prevent this method of AMSI bypass exists. However, businesses first need to be aware of the problem. Knowledge of the evolving threat landscape and the different ways that it can affect a company are key to promoting a secure environment. To improve your security posture, take preventative action by patching systems and training employees to recognize and prevent the first stage in an infection chain.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

Patch or Pass? CVE-2017-11882 Is a Security Conundrum

CISO Summary

Since the latter part of 2018, threat actors have increasingly exploited two Microsoft vulnerabilities: CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802. The first of these is especially popular. Cofense IntelligenceTM has seen it surge ahead of Microsoft macros as a favorite malware delivery method.

CVE-2017-11882 is an older vulnerability that in fact has a patch. However, it presents a conundrum for security teams that haven’t addressed the problem. They can choose to skip the patching, live with the risks, and keep on using the legacy program. Or they can update, patch, and lose the application entirely to gain much better security.

In the meantime, threat actors will happily exploit every chance they get.

Full Details

The vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Equation Editor that are exploited in CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802 have been “patched” for over a year. However, these vulnerabilities remain popular with threat actors and have become increasingly common since their inception. There are several factors involved, but Cofense Intelligence assesses that CVE-2017-11882 is still commonly used simply because it works, reaffirming the challenges associated with patching and the risks of operating legacy platforms. CVE-2017-11882 still works as a delivery mechanism on unpatched or unsupported versions of Microsoft Office and is most commonly used to deliver simple information stealers.

The Progression

In September 2018, Cofense Intelligence covered the most common malware delivery methods and highlighted Microsoft Office macros as making up the majority of the most common malware delivery methods. Over the last six months, we have observed a sharp increase in the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882.

The threat actors who switched to using CVE-2017-11882 as their primary delivery method focused significantly on information stealers, such as Loki Bot and AZORult, which make up 33% and 16% of the malware delivered respectively. In contrast, the most common Remote Access Trojan (RAT) is NanoCore RAT, which is the fifth most frequently malware delivered at only 7%.

Figure 1: Frequency of malware family delivered by CVE-2017-11882

But You Said There is a Patch!

Cofense Intelligence assesses that the most common reason CVE-2017-11882 still works for threat actors is that the patches intended to remedy it simply are not in place on several endpoints. Rather than assuming that support teams are incompetent, given that over a year has passed since the first patch, it is more likely that companies are being faced with a product support conundrum.

Businesses must choose between two options. The first is accepting a level of risk and continuing to use legacy programs by not patching. The second is to update, patch, and in this case, allow the removal of an application entirely in order to have significantly higher security. This is much easier for large businesses with great resources to devote to upgrades and security. For smaller businesses—including boutique subsidiaries of major businesses—this is much more difficult. Again, given the amount of time that has passed, it is unlikely at this point that anybody who has not yet updated will do so any time soon, allowing threat actors continued access.

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Pretty Pictures Sometimes Disguise Ugly Executables

CISO Summary

Reaching deep into their bag of tricks to avoid detection, threat actors are using an oldie but goodie— packing image files (think tropical beach scenes) with malicious executables, usually a .jpg. The technique allows attackers to avoid detection by some anti-virus programs that merely recognize a file as an image, but don’t check its full contents.

This vintage tactic works—threat actors still use it a lot. Anti-virus systems rely on file headers to detect malware. Tuning systems to rely less on file headers is difficult and sometimes impossible. One counter-measure that does work: educate employees not to fall for phishing emails and encourage them to report any they find suspicious.

Full Details

Cofense Intelligence™ has been tracking the ongoing usage of image files to disguise malicious executables, a technique that can easily bypass network security measures. Threat actors will use a first stage malware downloader to retrieve an image file, most often a .jpg. The malware downloader then extracts a malicious executable that is embedded within the image. Finally, the malware runs the extracted binary in memory to avoid dropping an additional executable to disk. By using this technique to download the second binary, threat actors are able to avoid detection by some anti-virus (AV) programs that can determine the downloaded file to be an image but do not check the rest of the file contents.

Delivery

The malware downloader often used to deliver these types of files is an executable using the .NET framework. From May 2018 to April 2019, Cofense Intelligence saw images with embedded executables comprising more than 70% of the binaries downloaded by .NET executables. The images can be anything from famous actors to server rooms, but one of the more common ones can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Commonly seen image

The images used not only display correctly but often have additional “metadata,” an example of which can be seen in Figure 2. This metadata is not present in all cases and may be an artifact from the original image before it was modified.

Figure 2: Additional meta data included in the image

Contents

The downloaded files are treated as images because of their file header and to a lesser degree, their file extension. File headers help the operating system determine how to interpret the contents of the file and can indicate several factors, such as whether a file is an image or an executable. Figure 3 illustrates that images with the .jpg extension, also known as JPEG images, will have the characters “JFIF” near the start of the file.

Figure 3: JPEG image file header

This header is also used by most AVs to determine the file type, as it is much more reliable than a file extension. When a “JFIF” header is read by most AVs the rest of the file will be ignored as long as the image is not broken or incomplete. The subterfuge of using an image file header also enables threat actors to bypass most network security measures which, like local AV, will treat the file as an image and ignore its content. By including an image that will properly display, threat actors are able to satisfy all of the conditions required for their malicious content to be ignored by security measures and “safely” delivered to the endpoint. This also ensures that if a file is manually downloaded and opened it will appear legitimate to the end user.

Extracting

Creating an image file that meets these requirements also ensures that the operating system does not recognize the file as an executable and will not execute the file, regardless of the program used to open it. This fact requires a downloader, such as a .NET executable, to “extract” the malicious executable from the image file. This can be easily done by searching the file contents for the file header representing an executable, “MZ,” as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Embedded executable header

Once this header is found, the executable content is carved out and loaded into memory rather than executing a file dropped to disk. Because the content is executed in memory rather than from an actual executable file, it is less likely to be recognized by AV as malicious. Most AV solutions do not monitor the memory of a process already running, which allows the malware to perform most of its activities without being noticed.

Staging

The fact that both a downloader and an image file are required to complete the infection is an important part of the infection strategy. If an image file is run by itself in an automated environment, it will simply display an image, with the only possibility of detection relying on the image file content having suspicious text. If only the downloader is executed and the image payload is unavailable, then it may be detected as suspicious, but on its own would not provide defenders with enough information to fully combat the threat. This requirement of having both stages together helps hide from defenders using automated analysis systems that are focused on individual files.

Why It Matters

Although not a new technique, the consistent popularity and utility of this approach to malware delivery merits attention. Threat actors abuse of operating system and AV reliance on file header recognition has been and will continue to be a problem. An example of threat actors abusing this reliance to trick AV systems as well as analysts was also recently covered by CofenseTM. Tuning AV systems to detect malware without relying on file headers is difficult and, in some cases, impossible. To properly recognize threats, it is important to have a full picture of the different components involved in an attack rather than attempting to organize individual and possibly incomplete analysis. To avoid this pitfall and better protect their network environments, organizations need to ensure that employees are trained to not fall victim to the phishing emails and that defenders are ready should an incident happen.

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All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

When You Unsubscribe to these Emails, You ‘Subscribe’ to the Loda RAT

CISO Summary

It’s critical that anti-phishing programs reflect the latest threats. Cofense IntelligenceTM has recently observed a phishing campaign that illustrates why. It entices users to download a malicious document from a seemingly legitimate source, an insurance company whose roots go back to 1896. Through a complex chain of abuse, including the exploitation of a legit subdomain hosted by Microsoft, this threat is capable of tricking users unfamiliar with wrinkles like multiple links to the same source and malicious “unsubscribe” links. If successful, the attack activates the Loda Remote Access Trojan, underscoring the importance of educating users to stop phishing emails.

Full Details

Cofense Intelligence recently observed a campaign that used convincing emails to entice recipients into downloading a malicious document from a seemingly legitimate source. These attention-grabbing emails contained multiple links to the same source, which was hosted on a subdomain of the legitimate Microsoft-owned domain azurewebsites[.]net. This source URL downloaded a Microsoft Word document that abused an object relationship to then download and open an RTF document. The RTF document abused CVE-2017-11882 to download the multi-functional Loda Remote Access Trojan. By taking advantage of users’ assumption that unsubscribe links are legitimate, along with their trust in verification, threat actors were able to craft a campaign capable of fooling even users with basic security awareness training.

What a Deal…

The emails used in this campaign have several attributes that give the appearance of legitimacy. The first email, the top of which is shown in Figure 1, impersonates Fidelity Life and claims to offer a good deal on life insurance.

 Figure 1: Body of the email spoofing Fidelity

In this email, the only actual text present is the unsubscribe information at the bottom of the email shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Unsubscribe section of the email spoofing Fidelity

The top three paragraphs in Figure 2 are in fact an image, while the bottom paragraph (with a pointer hovering over it) is searchable text that appears to have been added by the threat actor. All of the image shown in Figure 1 is a clickable link leading to the same URL as the unsubscribe link, hxxps://onlinefinances[.]azurewebsites[.]net/mowgli/fidelity_insurance[.]docx.

Verification Passed

If users who have been trained to be suspicious of links were to first visit the website by typing the URL into an internet browser and looking at the webpage information, they would see the information shown in Figure 3.

If users are particularly security conscious, they might even look up the domain on a website with tools that check for legitimacy. However, this would likely give them the same information as what is shown in Figure 3, because most tools will check the root domain, in this case azurewebsites[.]net, which is a completely legitimate domain owned by Microsoft. The only easily recognized indicator of malicious content is the prompt when a file is downloaded from an unsubscribe link.

Double Interest

The second email, shown in Figure 4, pretends to be a relatively benign “news” email from the company Livenlonpro about a new Amazon policy.

Figure 4: Body of the email spoofing Livenlonpro

In this case all links and images download a file from hxxps://onlinefinances[.]azurewebsites[.]net/mowgli/Amazon_Cancelled_order[.]docx. With this approach, any user that attempts to unsubscribe from what appears to be a spam email will instead download malware. Although differently named, the downloaded file is the same for both emails.

Actual Goal

Once the file is downloaded and opened, it attempts to use an object relationship to download a document with CVE-2017-11882 which, in turn, downloads the multi-functional Loda malware. Loda is capable of acting stealthily to download additional malware or provide the threat actor with full remote access to the victim’s computer.

Direct Importance

Attacks such as this demonstrate threat actors ability to adapt to changing circumstances and training methods. Organizations often focus employee training on the philosophy “don’t click suspicious links or open attachments.” While usually effective, this method can fall prey to creative threat actors. Using a training method that encourages employees to think critically can help protect organizations by avoiding situations where employees make assumptions about the nature of a link and act accordingly.

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All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

This ‘Broken’ File Hides Malware Designed to Break Its Targets

CISO Summary

Cofense IntelligenceTM has identified a phishing campaign with a malicious attachment containing a “broken” file that actually works, in all the wrong ways. Under certain conditions, the file weaponizes in the target environment after evading both automated and manual analysis.

The “break” is the lack of a file header, engineered to fool analysts into thinking the attachment is harmless, the work of threat actors too clumsy to be taken seriously. The headless file only appears when you open the attachment or use special programs in attempting to extract it.

The campaign tries to exploit a common problem: information overload. As they process and prioritize mountains of information, analysts and automated defenses sometimes ignore faulty files because they seem to be benign. In this campaign, the file downloads a script to fix the missing header and then run the full file, if the target environment permits it.

While multi-stage evasive techniques are the exception not the rule, they can lead to devastating results. To protect against campaigns like this, it’s smart to invest in solutions that leverage both human intuition and threat automation.

Full Details

Cofense Intelligence recently observed a campaign that delivered what appeared to be a broken executable—almost certain to evade detection as malicious—only to be fully weaponized once within  the target’s environment. By delivering an apparently broken executable, threat actors were able to disguise their intentions from several different kinds of automated and manual analyses. Cursory analysis showed that the executable was missing a proper “file header.” Because of the missing file header, it was more likely that an analyst would simply dismiss the threat actors as being incompetent and ignore the campaign. In reality, the campaign was designed so that the document would download a script to fix the “file header” and run the now complete executable, if the desired conditions within the hosting environment were met.

What’s in a Header

Essentially, a file header helps the operating system determine how to interpret the contents of the file. Header information can indicate several factors, such as whether a file is an archive or an executable. In the case of most Windows executables, the file starts with the characters MZ. This MZ header is almost always present, even when executables are packed, obfuscated, or embedded. The hexadecimal content of an executable, including the MZ header, can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Hexadecimal view of an MZ file header of an executable

If this header is not present, then the executable will simply fail to run. Some analysts as well as automated analysis systems and executable extraction programs will ignore any files without an appropriate header, under the assumption that they are broken. An example of the same executable from Figure 1, but with a missing MZ header, can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: The same file as Figure 1 without an MZ header

The executable from Figure 1 no longer runs without the MZ header. Conversely, all that is needed to make the executable in Figure 2 run is the addition of “MZ” to the top of the binary.

What Happened Here

In the campaign observed by Cofense Intelligence, the malicious document drops an embedded object as a partial executable—the header of this file can be seen in Figure 2. Because this executable does not have an MZ header, it is only detected by 2/58* antivirus engines on VirusTotal. It also means that analysts who see the binary and attempt to run it as an executable will be unsuccessful and may assume that the binary is broken—and be technically correct in so doing. Once the partial executable has been dropped, the malicious document then makes use of CVE-2017-11882 to download and execute the contents of an .hta file. An example is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Contents of downloaded .hta file

There are four steps of interest in this script. The first step creates a file “~F9.TMP” with the contents “MZ”:

Figure 4: First step in “creating” an executable

The second step adds the contents of the new file (“MZ”) to the start of a file named “~AFER125419.TMP”. The file “~AFER125419.TMP” is actually the name of the object embedded in the original executable:

Figure 5: Second step in creating an executable

After the “MZ” header is added, the new file is the same as the one shown in Figure 1. Although the file retains the .TMP extension it can still be run as an executable from the command line:

Figure 6: Third step in creating an executable

In the final step, the binary is copied to the Windows “Startup” folder, renaming it as an executable and ensuring that it will run on the next computer startup. This provides persistence for the malware on the targeted machine.

Figure 7: Fourth step in creating an executable

How It Helps Them and Hurts Us

The malicious document used in this instance was in fact detected by antivirus companies, largely due to its use of an equation editor exploit with minimal obfuscation and an embedded object. However, when dropped to disk the embedded object is only detected by 2/58* of the antivirus companies on VirusTotal. When the object is completed by adding the “MZ header,” this detection ratio jumps to 40/71*, demonstrating that the lack of an MZ header confuses automated systems and analysts alike. The fact that the binary can run as an executable only after being modified by a downloaded script provides several layers of distraction from the actual threat.

  • First, the computer must have access to the internet; this prevents the binary from running in some sandboxes and analysis environments which by default do not have internet access. It also ensures that any manual static analysis done on the binary will determine the binary to be “broken,” increasing the likelihood that it will be ignored.
  • In order for further analyses to take place, the script must still be available. If the script is unavailable due to the threat actor taking it down or any other reason, the binary never becomes an executable and is unlikely to be detected.
  • Finally, if the script is downloaded separately and run, it will create two 2-byte files and display an error message, further reinforcing its appearance as a poorly put together malware campaign.

Why It Matters

Information overload is a serious problem for any enterprise. To quickly process and prioritize information, both analysts and technical defenses will sometimes ignore “broken” files that do not run. If these files are recognized as a threat, analysts are often still forced to prioritize more obviously damaging malware instead of fixing a “broken” sample. Even if these steps are taken, the binary delivered in this campaign was only functional if a very specific set of criteria were met. This type of multi-stage execution designed to avoid detection is infrequent yet no less dangerous. To protect themselves from similar threats, organizations need to invest in both preventative programs and training as well as resources that use human experience in addition to automated malware analysis to uncover threats.

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Table 1: File IoCs

File Name MD5 Hash
9t3R1Ng5(.hta) c0266ac68a5de7c08fee0e7bd4b3b4aa
Enerson Energy_2018&2019_quotation.doc fa447b70e2550d66f0ebfa704a4c9552
~AFER125419.tmp 32c4c5186c0affa8c5f630253bbf5acc
~191AEF9.tmp 135dedc1e10a7d78f906cb485b328145

 

Table 2: Network IoCs**

URLs
hxxp://37[.]49[.]225[.]195/hook/logs/fre[.]php
hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/9t3R1Ng5

 

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

 

* These statistics were from a sample analysis done on 2019-03-25.

** pastebin[.]com is not inherently malicious

A Closer Look at Why the QakBot Malware Is So Dangerous

CISO Summary

Cofense Intelligence ™ recently reported a phishing campaign distributing the QakBot malware. QakBot infestation is a significant threat, so be sure to share today’s follow-up post with your SOC analysts.

We’ll drill down into the novel techniques QakBot uses to stymie detection and manual analysis. This sophisticated banking trojan, which Cofense™ has seen distributed via the Geodo/Emotet botnet, uses multiple tools to cover its tracks and steal credentials. The threat actors who have developed it are creative and aggressive.

With Upgrades in Delivery and Support Infrastructure, Revenge RAT Malware is a Bigger Threat

CISO Summary

The Revenge RAT malware is getting stealthier, thanks to unusually advanced delivery techniques and support infrastructure. Cofense IntelligenceTM has recently seen this basic and widely available Remote Access Trojan benefit from these upgrades, which help it to access webcams, microphones, and other utilities as Revenge RAT does recon and tries to gain a foothold in targeted computers. When they succeed, RATs enable threat actors to wreak havoc, including monitoring user behavior through keyloggers or other spyware, filching personal information, and distributing other malware.

Exploiting an Unpatched Vulnerability, the Ave_Maria Malware Is Not Full of Grace

CISO Summary

CofenseTM has seen a rise in phishing campaigns designed to deliver a type of stealer malware called Ave_Maria. It contains a capability, DLL hijacking, that uses a vulnerability with no forthcoming fix. With origins in a publicly available utility, DLL lets Ave_Maria gain greater admin privileges and avoid detection, then steal information so it can download additional plugins and potentially other payloads. This malware can bypass detection and privilege restrictions on many endpoints.