With Upgrades in Delivery and Support Infrastructure, Revenge RAT Malware is a Bigger Threat

CISO Summary

The Revenge RAT malware is getting stealthier, thanks to unusually advanced delivery techniques and support infrastructure. Cofense IntelligenceTM has recently seen this basic and widely available Remote Access Trojan benefit from these upgrades, which help it to access webcams, microphones, and other utilities as Revenge RAT does recon and tries to gain a foothold in targeted computers. When they succeed, RATs enable threat actors to wreak havoc, including monitoring user behavior through keyloggers or other spyware, filching personal information, and distributing other malware.

Exploiting an Unpatched Vulnerability, the Ave_Maria Malware Is Not Full of Grace

CISO Summary

CofenseTM has seen a rise in phishing campaigns designed to deliver a type of stealer malware called Ave_Maria. It contains a capability, DLL hijacking, that uses a vulnerability with no forthcoming fix. With origins in a publicly available utility, DLL lets Ave_Maria gain greater admin privileges and avoid detection, then steal information so it can download additional plugins and potentially other payloads. This malware can bypass detection and privilege restrictions on many endpoints.

“Brazilian Election” Themed Phish Target Users with South American-Targeted Malware, Astaroth Trojan

Threat actors attempted to leverage the current Brazilian presidential election to distribute the Astaroth WMIC Trojan to Brazilian victims. The emails had a subject line related to an alleged scandal involving Brazilian then-presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro. Some campaigns impersonated a well-known Brazilian research and statistics company. Multiple delivery methods and geolocation techniques were used to target Brazilian users, who were encouraged to interact with the attached and downloaded archives containing .lnk files. These files downloaded the first stage of the Astaroth WMIC Trojan, previously spotted this year by the Cofense Phishing Defense Center and known to target South American users.

Potential Misuse of Legitimate Websites to Avoid Malware Detection

Sometimes, common malware will attempt to gather information about its environment, such as public IP address, language, and location. System queries and identifier websites like whatismyipaddress.com are often used for these purposes, but are easily identified by modern network monitors and antivirus. It’s important to know, however, that everyday interactions with legitimate websites provide much of the same information and are not monitored because the interactions are legitimate. In other words, threat actors can bypass automated defenses by abusing legitimate websites that often cannot be blocked for business purposes.

First, cookies—easily accessible records of a user’s interactions with a webpage—are often stored on the local machine and can be accessed by malware.  Second, some servers include additional information about the local machine in the response header. Though this is not as easily accessible to the average computer user, it could be leveraged by malicious actors to gain information related to the local machine’s settings, location, operating system, public IP address, language, region, and unique identifiers.

This information about the local environment could be used to avoid directly querying the local machine, avoiding techniques that trigger automated defenses. For example, a malicious document could determine the region of an infected computer from wikipedia.org to bypass network monitoring systems looking for web traffic to identifier websites like whatismyipaddress.com and then download region specific malware that is tailored to combat the antivirus software used in that region.

What Information Can Be Derived

Wikipedia’s response headers highlight the wealth of valuable information available to a malicious actor (Figure 1). Here, the “set-cookie” field contains the cookie value, which includes the GeoIP of the browser, consisting of the country, city, and GPS coordinates. The “x-client-ip” in the header records the public IP address of the local machine (redacted).

Figure 1: A response header from Wikipedia

Google has a useful cookie to track if a user has accepted their terms of service. As seen in Figure 2, this small cookie contains the state of agreement, the country where the computer is located, and the language of the browser used.

Figure 2: Matching contents of Google’s CONSENT cookie

How This Information Is Used

Some of this information, such as the IP address, can be leveraged by threat actors to determine if the infected computer is within a certain IP range of particular interest, such as Amazon Web Services or Microsoft Azure. Other malware families will not run unless the infected machine is located in a specific country. Malware that downloads additional files uses many different sources to obtain a variety of information about the local environment including:

  • Using the location and language to determine what to deliver (as discussed in a prior blog)
  • Noting the operating system to determine what kind of malware to deliver
  • Determining the use of a VPN based on the IP address to decide whether to run

What Actions Look Suspicious

Automated systems and malware sandboxes often monitor a list of events that are rarely made by legitimate software. These events include system queries for information such as the system language, generating cryptographic key, or the operating system version, as well as network traffic. Certain language checks or domains appearing in network traffic will trigger alerts, as seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3: A moderate event alert from a Cuckoo sandbox execution

Avoiding Alerts When Seeking Valuable Information

By making web requests to legitimate websites, malware can obtain additional information about its environment while avoiding detection. Suspicious system calls or network traffic that might alert automated systems can be avoided by deriving information from these web requests. There is nothing inherently malicious about contacting legitimate websites, and no suspicions would be raised simply based on such contact.  Many of these checks can be done unobtrusively. This leads researchers to assume the malware is not functional rather than that it is detecting an analysis environment. For example, the same cookie shown in Figure 2 can also be used to detect a mismatch between the browser language and endpoint country (shown in Figure 4).

Figure 4: The endpoint is recorded as Germany (DE,) but the browser language is French(fr)

Potential Impact

This technique is not currently widely used, but offers several benefits to attackers and would be difficult for organizations to defend against. Websites such as Wikipedia and Google cannot simply be blocked, and current local and network defenses may not be able to distinguish traffic that is not inherently malicious. Although this does not disguise the connections that malware makes to its command and control hosts or payload servers, it does hinder analysis and allows an infection to progress further before it is detected.

Given the ease with which threat actors are able to bypass automated defenses by abusing legitimate websites and tools that often cannot be blocked for business purposes, it is imperative that individuals be trained to recognize the initial threat and to report it. Combining this training with human verified intelligence helps to ensure a successful defense strategy.

Learn how Cofense PhishMe™ helps thousands of organizations train users to spot and report phishing emails.

For more information on the abuse of legitimate websites for data exfiltration and malware delivery, as well as the abuse of Microsoft Utilities to avoid detection, see these previous Cofense™ blogs:  “Threat Actors Abusing Google Docs” and “Abusing Microsoft Windows Utilities.”


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Abusing Microsoft Windows Utilities to Deliver Malware for Fun and Profit

Last year, Cofense Intelligence™ observed an increase in abuse of features built into platforms that are all but ubiquitous throughout the corporate world. An overview of these developments in 2017 was covered in our 2017 Malware Review, which highlighted the abuse of Microsoft features such as Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) and Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to deliver malware. Since last year, this trend has continued as threat actors are exploiting a greater variety of features as well as combining multiple techniques into one campaign.

Zeus Panda Advanced Banking Trojan Gets Creative to Scam Affluent Victims in Italy

Cofense Intelligence™ recently observed a sample of Zeus Panda which, upon further research, revealed the malware has been increasingly employing a very creative tactic. This crafty malware variant distracts its victims while quietly draining the victims’ bank accounts, even those accounts that employ additional security mechanisms such as Multi-Factor Authentication. After transferring funds, the malware then masks any evidence that the illicit transactions ever occurred. This tactic ensures that victims with the deepest pockets will remain in the dark as their bank accounts are silently liquidated.

Vulture Stealer: What Banload Misses, Chrome Extension Receives

PhishMe Intelligence™ has uncovered a phishing campaign that delivers a new loader/browser plugin combination that we have dubbed Vulture Stealer. Vulture Stealer is a two-stage data stealer that includes a version of Banload banking trojan malware. However, paired with an extensive secondary stealer it can target and gather information beyond Banload’s reach within Google Chrome—effectively gathering any information entered within the compromised Chrome browser.  This campaign, which uses Portuguese-language phishing messages, may be targeting Brazilian banks and their customers. This is the first time PhishMe® has observed Banload coupled with a malicious browser extension.