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BazarBackdoor’s Stealthy Infiltration Evades Multiple SEGs

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By Zachary Bailey, Cofense Phishing Defense Center

The Cofense PDC has been tracking a stealthy malware campaign that has recently become more active compromising enterprise endpoints. The campaign, first observed in mid-Decembercarries pharmaceutical-themed invoices that contain references to a series of websites hosted on the “shop” domain but that were down at the time of initial analysis. They were classified by the PDC as malicious because of the phone numbers used on the invoices. These numbers were identical across invoices being sent in from different brands and senders, which meant these are likely coordinated. The main lures of the emails also revolved around contacting the phone number instead of visiting the site.  

Figure 1: Email Body 

New waves of the phishing emails are now being sent overnight with new brands ranging from office supplies, rose delivery and lingerie. After monitoring certain internet sources, PDC analysts were able to pull up the referenced sites while they were still live. Following an involved process of interacting with the site to request a cancellation form, a malicious Excel document was finally retrieved. This infection was the first stage of the BazarBackdoor malware. 

The invoice ruse bypassed various customer SEGs because the email had no malicious payload and could be seen as a simple phishing scam. Only a handful of recipients would think to browse to the invoice site and search for a way to cancel their order without calling the number provided.

Figure 2Invoice Attachment 

While the invoices use a basic template, they look just professional enough that an inquisitive recipient might check the site to see if its legitimate. Invoices for the older campaigns would be named after the order number, but recent campaigns are utilizing a “invoice_*.pdf” format, where the star (*) wildcard is the order number. 

It has been observed that the next stage in this social engineering attack alternates between being located on the contact, FAQ and refund pages of the website. 

Figure 3Contact Form 

If the order number is entered, the recipient will be transferred to a new website with a “.us” domain version of the prior website. There are several variations of the site, for instance using hyphens to break up the words or using only the first and third words of the fictitious brand. Examples of this would be compact-ssd[.]us and compactstorage[.]us 

Figure 4: Download Page 

Once the site is loaded, a series of images walks the user through downloading a form to cancel their order. There is a link to the request form, and a link to an email where the form is to be sent. This furthers the ruse’s legitimacy. The downloaded form is an Excel document that appears to be encrypted by DocuSign.  

Figure 5: Excel Template 

This Excel template is themed similarly to a Trickbot template reported on Twitter by @ffforward, who has been tracking the campaign closely. This connection makes sense considering the agreement in many quarters that there is a connection between Trickbot operators and the group behind BazarBackdoor.

When the form is activated, an .EXE payload is immediately launched. This executable is also a new variant of BazarBackdoor. It will reload itself into memory several times before the command-and-controls (C2s) can finally be extracted. Next, the executable queries the geographical location and IP address of the infected machine. This is a common tactic that usually ensures that the threat actor does not infect machines in their country of operation. 

Figure 6: Bazar in Memory Strings 

After the .EXE finishes loading, we see BazarBackdoor domains in the memory strings. 

Figure 7: C2s for Bazarbackdoor 

We also can find this campaign’s C2 for dropping the next stage by searching for IP addresses in the strings. There is often a common word in the C2s, such as “cleaner” or “book” or “snow” that differentiates between campaigns. In the observed campaign for this article, that word is “round_table”. 

Figure 8: DNS traffic 

An analysis of the machine’s network traffic reveals that DNS requests are being sent by BazarBackdoor. This is a common technique the malware employs to mask the servers behind the “bazar” domains. The TCP connections to the three “round_table” servers will drop a data file that is likely part of the next stage. 

Recent invoice templates have shifted from using the “.shop” domain to “.net” domains. This campaign was also referred to as “BazarCall” by @ffforward. It is widely believed that this campaign, like prior BazarBackdoor campaigns, will distribute Ryuk ransomware across the network. An analysis by The DFIR Report found Cobalt strike beacons in their environment, and PowerShell scripts that are seen in conjunction with Ryuk. However, no Ryuk was deployed during the analysis. 

The Cofense PDC is still looking into the connection between Kontakt Kegtap and the Bazarloader/Bazarbackdoor campaigns being delivered from Google Docs and GetResponse.

Indicators of Compromise 


Domain  IP   
























Command and Control URLs  IP   












hxxps://34[.]209[.]41[.]233/foreground/suspect/context59  3420941233 



hxxps://34[.]221[.]125[.]90/foreground/suspect/context59  3422112590 
hxxps://japort[.]com/suret/victory[.]php  5087232245 


51[.]254[.]25[.]115:53   51[.]254[.]25[.]115  
193[.]183[.]98[.]66:53   193[.]183[.]98[.]66  
91[.]217[.]137[.]37:53   91[.]217[.]137[.]37  
87[.]98[.]175[.]85:53   87[.]98[.]175[.]85  
185[.]121[.]177[.]177:53   185[.]121[.]177[.]177  
169[.]239[.]202[.]202:53   169[.]239[.]202[.]202  
198[.]251[.]90[.]143:53   198[.]251[.]90[.]143  
5[.]132[.]191[.]104:53   5[.]132[.]191[.]104  
111[.]67[.]20[.]8:53   111[.]67[.]20[.]8  
163[.]53[.]248[.]170:53   163[.]53[.]248[.]170  
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142[.]4[.]205[.]47:53   142[.]4[.]205[.]47  
158[.]69[.]239[.]167:53   158[.]69[.]239[.]167  
104[.]37[.]195[.]178:53   104[.]37[.]195[.]178  
192[.]99[.]85[.]244:53   192[.]99[.]85[.]244  
158[.]69[.]160[.]164:53   158[.]69[.]160[.]164  
46[.]28[.]207[.]199:53   46[.]28[.]207[.]199  
31[.]171[.]251[.]118:53   31[.]171[.]251[.]118  
81[.]2[.]241[.]148:53   81[.]2[.]241[.]148  
82[.]141[.]39[.]32:53   82[.]141[.]39[.]32  
50[.]3[.]82[.]215:53   50[.]3[.]82[.]215  
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5[.]45[.]97[.]127:53   5[.]45[.]97[.]127  
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144[.]76[.]133[.]38:53   144[.]76[.]133[.]38  
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172[.]104[.]136[.]243:53   172[.]104[.]136[.]243  
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163[.]172[.]185[.]51:53   163[.]172[.]185[.]51  
5[.]135[.]183[.]146:53   5[.]135[.]183[.]146  
51[.]255[.]48[.]78:53   51[.]255[.]48[.]78  
188[.]165[.]200[.]156:53   188[.]165[.]200[.]156  
147[.]135[.]185[.]78:53   147[.]135[.]185[.]78  
92[.]222[.]97[.]145:53   92[.]222[.]97[.]145  
51[.]255[.]211[.]146:53   51[.]255[.]211[.]146  
159[.]89[.]249[.]249:53   159[.]89[.]249[.]249  
104[.]238[.]186[.]189:53   104[.]238[.]186[.]189  
139[.]59[.]23[.]241:53   139[.]59[.]23[.]241  
94[.]177[.]171[.]127:53   94[.]177[.]171[.]127  
45[.]63[.]124[.]65:53   45[.]63[.]124[.]65  
212[.]24[.]98[.]54:53   212[.]24[.]98[.]54  
178[.]17[.]170[.]179:53   178[.]17[.]170[.]179  
185[.]208[.]208[.]141:53   185[.]208[.]208[.]141  
82[.]196[.]9[.]45:53   82[.]196[.]9[.]45  
146[.]185[.]176[.]36:53   146[.]185[.]176[.]36  
89[.]35[.]39[.]64:53   89[.]35[.]39[.]64  
89[.]18[.]27[.]167:53   89[.]18[.]27[.]167  
77[.]73[.]68[.]161:53   77[.]73[.]68[.]161  
185[.]117[.]154[.]144:53   185[.]117[.]154[.]144  
176[.]126[.]70[.]119:53   176[.]126[.]70[.]119  
139[.]99[.]96[.]146:53   139[.]99[.]96[.]146  
217[.]12[.]210[.]54:53   217[.]12[.]210[.]54  
185[.]164[.]136[.]225:53   185[.]164[.]136[.]225  
192[.]52[.]166[.]110:53   192[.]52[.]166[.]110  
63[.]231[.]92[.]27:53   63[.]231[.]92[.]27  
66[.]70[.]211[.]246:53   66[.]70[.]211[.]246  
96[.]47[.]228[.]108:53   96[.]47[.]228[.]108  
45[.]32[.]160[.]206:53   45[.]32[.]160[.]206  
128[.]52[.]130[.]209:53   128[.]52[.]130[.]209  
35[.]196[.]105[.]24:53   35[.]196[.]105[.]24  
172[.]98[.]193[.]42:53   172[.]98[.]193[.]42  
162[.]248[.]241[.]94:53   162[.]248[.]241[.]94  
107[.]172[.]42[.]186:53   107[.]172[.]42[.]186  
167[.]99[.]153[.]82:53   167[.]99[.]153[.]82  
138[.]197[.]25[.]214:53   138[.]197[.]25[.]214  
69[.]164[.]196[.]21:53   69[.]164[.]196[.]21  
192[.]71[.]245[.]208:53   192[.]71[.]245[.]208  
185[.]120[.]22[.]15:53   185[.]120[.]22[.]15  
45[.]71[.]185[.]100:53   45[.]71[.]185[.]100 


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