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By Max Gannon and Brad Haas, Cofense Intelligence

Cofense Intelligence has analyzed a security awareness training-themed campaign that spoofs a training reminder email from KnowBe4. Embedded links in the email direct victims to a credential phishing page targeting both Microsoft Outlook credentials and personal information. The phishing kit is hosted on compromised sites and has been used on at least 30 domains since mid-April 2020, as detailed below.

The emails used in this campaign attempt to pressure recipients into clicking the link by warning that the user only has one day left to complete a required training. They also discourage recipients from browsing directly to legitimate company training pages with the following statement: “Please note this training is not available on the employee training Portal. You need to use the link below to complete the training[.]”

Figure 1: Phishing email spoofing a KnowBe4 notification

The phishing kit used in this attack first collects Outlook credentials, then loads another page soliciting several pieces of personal information.

Figure 2: First page of the credential phishing kit

Figure 3: Second page of the credential phishing kit

As noted, the campaign’s credential phishing kit has been hosted on at least 30 other sites since mid-April 2020. The kits all used the same exfiltration methods and files as the spoofed KnowBe4 campaign, targeting Outlook credentials. Previous campaigns using this kit had a sexual harassment training theme rather than a security training theme. Those campaigns redirected to a legitimate page related to sexual harassment, shown in Figure 4, after the credentials requested in Figure 2 and Figure 3 were entered. The credential phishing kit linked in the spoofed KnowBe4 campaign has already been taken down, but it is very likely that the threat actors redirected from it to a security training-related page instead.

Figure 4: The credential phishing kit from previous campaigns redirected to this page

After additional analysis, we discovered that several of the compromised sites, many of which run WordPress, had recently been used to host a specific web shell, “CHips L MINI SHELL.” The shell has a relatively small feature set, allowing attackers to upload and edit files on a compromised site. It has already been removed from the sites in most instances. However, it was installed on some of them in a way that made it publicly visible, so cached Google search results show that it had been present, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Web shell on compromised site hosting the credential phishing kit

The indicator of compromise (IOC) table below includes the phishing kit URLs mentioned above.

Table 1: IOCs

Associated Credential Phishing URLs
hxxps://2014[.]digitree[.]co[.]kr/samhwa/lib/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://acertijos[.]com[.]ar/Blog/wp-includes/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://avellanoeuropeo[.]ufro[.]cl/wp-content/plugins/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://breckinridgecounty[.]net/[.]well-known/acme-challenge/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://docentes[.]uto[.]edu[.]bo/dmoyaa/wp-includes/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://g5lab[.]com/aspera/uploads/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://greenup[.]co[.]in/wp-includes/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://kikihalekararlari[.]com/assets/plugins/flot/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://mobiletradesman[.]co[.]uk/wp-admin/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://modoou[.]net/wp-content/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://msk[.]turbolider[.]ru/wp-includes/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://niceoldtownapartment[.]com/wp-content/plugins/fusion-core/tinymce/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://otorrinosensantafe[.]com[.]mx/[.]well-known/pki-validation/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://pandeyize[.]com/[.]well-known/acme-challenge/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://plazaempresarial[.]com/[.]well-known/acme-challenge/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://propertyask[.]com/[.]well-known/pki-validation/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://rashifal[.]com/img/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://rotularltda[.]com/[.]well-known/acme-challenge/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://skinnyontherunapp[.]com/[.]well-known/acme-challenge/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://somelit[.]org/wp-content/plugins/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://tcvsat[.]com/tcvsat-respnov19/wp-includes/IXR/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://thegsmshop[.]com/wp-includes/css/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://www[.]aajtaknews[.]in/wp-content/cache/all/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://www[.]auntynise[.]com/[.]well-known/acme-challenge/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://www[.]happychappybrands[.]com/wp-includes/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://www[.]healthfavour[.]com/wp-includes/css/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://www[.]mvoguesalon[.]com/bootstrap/cache/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://www[.]samicultura[.]com[.]br/includes/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://www[.]search4blog[.]com/wp-content/plugins/bid/login[.]php
hxxps://digitalprakhar[.]com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/bid/login[.]php

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