New Phishing Campaign Bypasses Microsoft ATP to Deliver Adwind to Utilities Industry

The CofenseTM Phishing Defense CenterTM has observed a new phishing campaign that spoofs a PDF attachment to deliver the notorious Adwind malware. This campaign was found explicitly in national grid utilities infrastructure. Adwind, aka JRAT or SockRat, is sold as a malware-as-a-service where users can purchase access to the software for a small subscription-based fee.

The malware boasts the following features:

  • Takes screen shots
  • Harvests credentials from Chrome, IE and Edge
  • Accesses the webcam, record video and take photos
  • Records audio from the microphone
  • Transfers files
  • Collects general system and user information
  • Steals VPN certificates
  • Serves as a Key Logger

Email Body

Fig1. Email Body

This email comes from a hijacked account at Friary Shoes. Also note the web address for Fletcher Specs, whose domain threat actors are abusing to host the malware.

The email body is simple and to the point: “Attached is a copy of our remittance advice which you are required to sign and return.” At the top of the email is an embedded image which is meant to look like a PDF file attachment, however, is in fact a jpg file with an embedded hyperlink. When victims click on the attachment, they are brought to the infection URL hxxps://fletcherspecs[.]co[.]uk/ where the initial payload is downloaded.

Fig 2. Payload 

The initial payload is in the form of a .JAR file named: “Scan050819.pdf_obf.jar.” Note that the attacker has attempted to make the file appear as if it were a PDF by attempting to obfuscate the file true extension.

Fig 3. Running processes

Once executed, we can see that two java.exe processes are created which load two separate .class files. JRAT then beacons out to its command and control server: hxxp://ns1648[.]ztomy[.]com

Fig 4. C2 Traffic

Adwind installs its dependencies and harvested information in: C:\Users\Byte\AppData\Local\Temp\. Here we can see the two class files the jave.exe process has loaded along with a registry key entries and several .dlls:

Fig5. Additional dependencies and artifacts 

The malware also attempts to circumvent analysis and avoid detection by using takskill.exe to disable popular analysis tools and antivirus software. If we take a closer look at the registry entries file we see that the malware looks for popular antivirus and malware analysis tools.

Fig 6. Anti-Analysis

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

Malicious File(s):

File Name: Scan050819.pdf_obf.jar

MD5: 6b94046ac3ade886488881521bfce90f

SHA256: b9cb86ae6a0691859a921e093b4d3349a3d8f452f5776b250b6ee938f4a8cba2

File size: 634,529 bytes (619K)


File Name: _0.116187311888071087770622558430261020.class

MD5: 781fb531354d6f291f1ccab48da6d39f

SHA256: 97d585b6aff62fb4e43e7e6a5f816dcd7a14be11a88b109a9ba9e8cd4c456eb9

File size: 247,088 bytes (241K)    


File Name: _0.40308597817769314486921725080498503.class

MD5: 781fb531354d6f291f1ccab48da6d39f

SHA256: 97d585b6aff62fb4e43e7e6a5f816dcd7a14be11a88b109a9ba9e8cd4c456eb9

File size: 247,088 bytes (241K)


File Name: gCMmWntWwp7328181049172078943.reg

MD5: 7f97f5f336944d427c03cc730c636b8f

SHA256: 9613caed306e9a267c62c56506985ef99ea2bee6e11afc185b8133dda37cbc57

File size: 27,926 bytes (27K)


File Name: Windows3382130663692717257.dll

MD5: 0b7b52302c8c5df59d960dd97e3abdaf

SHA256: a6be5be2d16a24430c795faa7ab7cc7826ed24d6d4bc74ad33da5c2ed0c793d0

File size: 46,592 bytes (45K)


File Name: sqlite-3.8.11.2-fd78b49b-d887-492e-8419-acb9dd4e311c-sqlitejdbc.dll

MD5: a4e510d903f05892d77741c5f4d95b5d

SHA256: a3fbdf4fbdf56ac6a2ebeb4c131c5682f2e2eadabc758cfe645989c311648506

File size: 695,808 bytes (679K)


File Name: Windows8838144181261500314.dll

MD5: c17b03d5a1f0dc6581344fd3d67d7be1

SHA256: 1afb6ab4b5be19d0197bcb76c3b150153955ae569cfe18b8e40b74b97ccd9c3d

File size: 39,424 bytes (38K)

 

Malicious URL(s):

hxxps://fletcherspecs[.]co[.]uk/

hxxp://ns1648[.]ztomy[.]com

 

Associated IP(s):

109[.]203[.]124[.]231

194[.]5[.]97[.]28

 

HOW COFENSE CAN HELP

89% of phishing threats delivering malware payloads analysed by the Cofense Phishing Defense Center bypassed secure email gateways. Condition users to be resilient to evolving phishing attacks with Cofense PhishMeTM.It offers a phishing simulation, “Remittance Advice – Adwind,” to educate users on the attack described in today’s blog.

Remove the blind spot with Cofense ReporterTM—give users a one-click tool to report suspicious messages, alerting security teams to potential threats.

Quickly turn user reported emails into actionable intelligence with Cofense TriageTM. Reduce exposure time by rapidly quarantining threats with Cofense VisionTM.

Easily consume phishing-specific threat intelligence to proactively defend your organisation against evolving threats with Cofense IntelligenceTM.

Thanks to our unique perspective, no one knows more about REAL phishing threats than Cofense. To understand current threats, read the 2019 Phishing Threat & Malware Review.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks. Any observations contained in this blog regarding circumvention of end point protections are based on observations at a point in time based on a specific set of system configurations.  Subsequent updates or different configurations may be effective at stopping these or similar threats.

TrickBot Adds ‘Cookie Grabber’ Information Stealing Module

Cofense Intelligence™ has identified a new credential information stealing module for the TrickBot banking trojan being used to gather web browser cookie data. Previous versions of TrickBot allowed for minimal web browser data theft; however, this ability was within the main functionality of the trojan platform and not a stand-alone module as it is now. This new module, dubbed ‘Cookie Grabber,’ has an added feature that allows for further control and manipulation of the victim’s host.

TrickBot is a modular banking trojan that targets financial information within an infected host. The threat actors behind TrickBot are always re-tooling and adapting to threat mitigation controls. By moving the web browser credential harvesting feature to a standalone module, threat actors trim down their initial footprint of infection. This adaption allows for fewer detections and the ability to download specific modules for better results after the infected host has been fingerprinted.

Safeguarding against this attack requires educating users about the importance of not saving credentials in the browser. For protection against other attacks, use technology to limit the number of times this type of payload gets to end users and educate them on the impacts these executables can have.

Technical Findings

The ‘Cookie Grabber’ module is downloaded in the same fashion as the other modules used by TrickBot. This module’s stark difference is the ability to parse through web browser databases locally to extract the targeted information. The module is placed within the %APPDATA%/Roaming directory with the other downloaded modules, all of which include ‘cookiesDll64’ in the naming convention.

This information stealing module targets Firefox, Chrome, and Internet Explorer web browsers. With Internet Explorer, the module targets the text files that store browser cookie information located within the user profile directories, as shown in Figure 1 (Appendix A). Additionally, it targets Firefox and Chrome cookie information that is housed within a SQLite database on the local host. The ‘Cookie Grabber’ module appears to have pre-defined SQL queries to gather the targeted information from both Firefox and Chrome. This module also makes use of a SQLite 3 embedded engine to allow for further database manipulation from the threat actor.

Once the infection has taken hold on the victim’s machine and the modules have been downloaded, decoded, and injected into svchost.exe, the sample then attempts to exfiltrate the gathered information using two HTTP POST commands.

  • The first HTTP POST is a form-data content-type to the Command and Control (C2) server containing other credentials harvested outside of the web browsers. Appended to the C2 URL is a unique string identifier containing host fingerprint information. This POST contains two distinct sections of information, one is the harvested credentials, the other is the source of the credentials. Figure 2 (Appendix B) shows the first HTTP POST to the C2 and contains FTP credentials gathered from the legitimate application, WinSCP.
  • The second HTTP POST to the C2, shown in Figure 3 (Appendix B), has a different User-Agent string, which has changed from a legitimate value to ‘dpost.’ The dpost value comes from the name of the configuration file used and serves as an identifying marker for the TrickBot’s network traffic used while exfiltrating the data. The destination port has also changed from 80 to 8082. This second HTTP POST includes the harvested web browser information, which is base64 encoded. The encoded information appears to contain the user profile name, the browser the information was harvested from, the URL, user name, password, time last used, and time created. These values are separated by a pipe (‘|’) and resemble the format below:

‘User Profile | Web Browser | URL | User Name | Password | Timestamp | Timestamp |/’

Each record collected by TrickBot and exfiltrated through the HTTP POST is separated by a forward slash (‘/’) character. In both HTTP POSTs, the C2 server was named ‘Cowboy’ and replied with a HTTP 200 OK containing a small text response of ‘/1/’. Figure 2 (Appendix B) shows the first HTTP POST to the C2, while Figure 3 (Appendix B) shows the second HTTP POST to the same C2. Notice the User-Agent value differences as well as the base64 encoded data strings within the second HTTP POST.

Recommendation:

CofenseTM encourages organizations to train users to be cautious in clicking links or opening attachments that could lead to harmful malware being installed on their machine. It’s also important to encourage users to report a suspicious message even if they clicked on the link or opened the attachment as malware can still get installed in the background.

The appendices below contain figures related to this sample of TrickBot. For more information please contact Intelligence@Cofense.com.

Appendix A:

Figure 1: Locations that ‘Cookie Grabber’ searched for Internet Explorer cookies

Appendix B:

Figure 2: The First HTTP POST to the C2 containing gathered non-web browser related credentials

Figure 3: The second HTTP POST to the C2 containing the base64 encoded credential strings

HOW COFENSE CAN HELP

89% of phishing threats delivering malware payloads analyzed by the Cofense Phishing Defense CenterTM bypassed email gateways. Condition users to be resilient to evolving phishing attacks with Cofense PhishMeTM and remove the blind spot with Cofense ReporterTM

Quickly turn user reported emails into actionable intelligence with Cofense TriageTM. Reduce exposure time by rapidly quarantining threats with Cofense VisionTM.

Consume phishing-specific threat intelligence to proactively defend your organization against evolving threats with Cofense IntelligenceTM.

Thanks to our unique perspective, no one knows more about REAL phishing threats than Cofense. Understand the evolving landscape—read the 2019 Phishing Threat & Malware Review.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

Cofense Labs Shares Research on Massive Sextortion Campaign

Are you one in two hundred (or so) million?  

Today, CofenseTM announced the launch of Cofense Labs. Our experts are sharing the details of some deep research into the inner workings of a large-scale sextortion campaign that to date has over 200m recipients in its sights – and you might be one of them.  

What’s Sextortion? 

You may be lucky enough to have not encountered the threatening narrative of a sextortion email. If so, the threat actor’s M.O. is typically this: 

Send an email in which they claim to have installed malware on your system and have a record of your browsing history to some websites of an adult nature, and also footage from your webcam. If you don’t pay the stated ransom in bitcoin, they will release the footage to your family, friends, and co-workers. To add credibility to their threats, they include passwords hoovered up from data breaches of old that they have found littering the web.  

Show me the money! 

Find Out If Your Business Is at Risk 

During the research into this campaign, Cofense Labs identified over 200m recipients on the target list. Over 7.8m sextortion emails have been analysed and bitcoin payments have been tracked. In this single campaign, over 17,000 bitcoin wallets were identified, with 1,265 payments being made across 321 of them, with one payment = one victim. At the time of analysis, these payments were worth over $1.8m.   

We have made it possible for you to check whether your email address, or email domain, is on the list. Just visit https://cofense.com/sextortion to perform the lookup and download an infographic and educational guide regarding sextortion campaigns and how to defend against them. 

Why Cofense Labs? 

Knowing is everything, and to be able to effectively defend against the fast-evolving phishing threat landscape, you’ve got to have a deep understanding of it. Cofense Labs allows us to share the results and the output of the pioneering research that our R&D team undertakes to provide this knowledge. By sharing what we know, we can hopefully enable organizations of all sizes to collaborate and protect their most precious assets against the latest phishing threats. 

If you’re at Black Hat in Las Vegas this week, come and see us at Booth 938 in the Shoreline Business Hall. You can meet members of the Cofense Labs team, and see whether your email address or domain is on the target list. 

 OTHER WAYS COFENSE CAN HELP 

Reports of sextortion and other ransom scams to the Cofense Phishing Defense CenterTM are increasing. Condition users to be resilient to evolving phishing attacks with Cofense PhishMeTM and remove the blind spot with Cofense ReporterTM. 

Quickly turn userreported emails into actionable intelligence with Cofense TriageTM. Reduce exposure time by rapidly quarantining threats with Cofense VisionTM. 

Attackers do their research. Every SaaS platform you use is an opportunity for attackers to exploit it. Understand what SaaS applications are configured for your domains – do YOUR research with Cofense CloudSeekerTM. 

Thanks to our unique perspective, no one knows more about REAL phishing threats than Cofense. To understand them better, read the 2019 Phishing Threat & Malware Review. 

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.  

Threat Actors Subscribe To Patches

Cofense IntelligenceTM has analyzed a relatively new malware known as Alpha Keylogger, which appears to be part of a growing trend among threat actors to use subscription-based malware that doesn’t deliver on its original promises. Part of the reason behind this trend is that threat actors are more frequently releasing malware builders that are incomplete and still under development, then charging users a subscription fee to have the builder updated with a “patch.” This practice has become increasingly common with enterprise software as well as video games, so it is not surprising to see the trend in the criminal underworld. The patching subscription model may be a burden to some enterprise environments, but its underworld equivalent is a significant boon to law enforcement and network defenders. Personnel tasked with combating nefarious software can leverage the patching and licensing mechanisms of subscription-based malware to track down distributors.  

The Reasons Behind The Model 

Much like with legitimate software, threat actors decide what malware to buy based on several factors including the reviews, price, type (such as a keylogger or a Remote Access Tool (RAT), developer, and marketing. However, to make money in this competitive environment, malware developers need to take different approaches, such as: 

  • Sell the product for much less than similar malware. 
  • Give the product away. While this strategy may appear to be a good deal, malware developers have been known to include a back door enabling them to steal their “customer’s” stolen data.  
  • Base the new malware on a pre-existing and well-known malware, such as WSH RAT. As discussed in a previous CofenseTM report, the developers of this RAT billed it as a “new” RAT with advanced features and offered it at a starting subscription price of only $50 per month. However, in reality, WSH RAT wasn’t new at all and was a variant of the pre-existing and long-lived Houdini Worm with some minor feature improvements. 
  • Focus on spending heavily on marketing. While concentrating on marketing can be profitable, it is likely the reason that some malware perceived as the “next big threat” disappears shortly after making headlines – probably because the budget was spent mainly on marketing rather than development.  

Possibly taking a lesson from legitimate software companies and the frequent failure of the options mentioned above, more and more malware developers have started to adopt the patching subscription model. This model allows them to take the middle road, charging relatively smaller subscriptions (in the case of Alpha Keylogger, $13 per month) while claiming to deliver more and being able to delay feature release.  

The glut of available products, however, often leads malware developers to over-promise on features for which they then must include a basic test or example of in their code. Expedited or rushed releases of the software lead to buggy code, in turn hurting the credibility of malware authors. For instance, Alpha Keylogger claims to have a suite of features including the ability to exfiltrate data over email, FTP, or via the API of the messaging company Telegram. In practice, customers (threat actors) can choose FTP or email, and the keylogger will still attempt to exfiltrate information via Telegram API even when the configuration data is blank. This attempt creates a distinct and apparent HTTPS request on infected machines that do not successfully exfiltrate data and can be used to help identify this malware in network traffic. 

Why Network Defenders Like Updates 

The “bug” in Alpha Keylogger that causes extraneous network traffic could allow network defenders to look for such malformed URLs as signs of malicious activity despite the involvement of a legitimate domain. Even intentional updates on the part of malware developers can assist network defenders. An example of this is when the Geodo/Emotet botnet began distributing a new module. The nature of this deployment allowed Cofense to correctly assess and prepare for the delivery of more sophisticated phishing emails. If the changes had been made by a new family of malware rather than as part of an update that Cofense was looking for, it would have been more challenging to prepare. 

Why Law Enforcement Likes Licensing 

The bugs and hints provided via malware updates are helpful to network defenders, but the licensing system behind these updates can be even more useful to law enforcement. Many RATs store the license key of the individual that purchased the malware builder as a registry entry on infected computers. Depending on the method used to obtain this license key, the payment information may be associated with the key even if it is not directly associated with the individual who purchased the key. Subsequentially, a receipt of some sort may be sent to an account that is accessed by the threat actor who bought the license key. Under the right circumstances, a license key saved as a registry entry on a victims computer could be linked with a receipt in a threat actor’s inbox, attributing them to the attack. Law enforcement organizations could then build a case using this link and additional information, such as the IP address used to access the inbox. 

Applicability In Enterprise Environments 

Organizations with enterprise-scale infrastructure often encounter “shadow IT” software or malware applications that can be difficult to spot and eradicate. The licensing mechanisms found in subscription-based malware—to include potential receipts in email—can be used by threat hunters to identify insider threats. Organizations impacted by malware akin to Alpha Keylogger can weed out further infections by leveraging incident response tools and YARA rules (such as the ones provided by Cofense IntelligenceTM) which inspect registry keys. Furthermore, the potential for attribution and legal action against a threat actor through license tracking provides large corporations with enhanced defensive capabilities. 

Table 1: Malware Artifacts 

Filename  MD5 
Company Profile.doc  b46396f32742da9162300efc1820abb3 
bukak.exe  3ceb85bcd9d123fc0d75aefade801568 

 

Table 2: Network IOCs 

IOC 
biz[@]Bootglobal[.]com 
kamonubilel[@]gmail[.]com 
hxxp://ktkingtiger[.]com/bukak[.]exe 

 

 

HOW COFENSE CAN HELP 

Cofense Intelligence processes and analyzes millions of emails and malware samples each day, providing a view of emerging phishing and malware threats. 

The Cofense Phishing Defense CenterTM identifies active phishing attacks in enterprise environments. Learn how our dedicated experts provide actionable intelligence to stop phishing threats. 

Condition end users to be resilient to ransomware and other attacks with Cofense PhishMeTM.  It includes a variety of ransomware templates to help users recognize the threat. Empower users to report phishing emails with one click using Cofense ReporterTM. 

Quickly turn user reported emails into actionable intelligence with Cofense TriageTM. Reduce exposure time by rapidly quarantining threats with Cofense VisionTM. 

Attackers do their research. Every SaaS platform you use is an opportunity for attackers to exploit it. Understand what SaaS applications are configured for your domains—do YOUR research with Cofense CloudSeekeTM. 

Thanks to our unique perspective, no one knows more about current REAL phishing threats than Cofense. To raise your understanding, read the 2019 Phishing Threat & Malware Review. 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.  

Ransomware: A Mid-Year Summary

By Alan Rainer

Recently, ransomware has given off the appearance of widespread destruction and rampant use. 2019 alone has seen headlines such as “Florida City Agrees to Pay Hackers $600,000” and “Baltimore City Operations Impaired by Cyber Criminals.” Yet, despite the resurgence of large-impact headlines, phishing campaigns have delivered less ransomware overall since 2016, per Cofense analytics. The decline in Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operations demonstrates an impact on threat actor ransomware activity. Attackers find that emerging protection technology, improved law enforcement tracking of cryptocurrency payments, systems patching, and costly infrastructure upkeep all pose a deterrent to broad-spectrum targeting.

Ransomware Is Down Holistically, But Targeted Infections Are Up

Threat actors find that targeted ransomware attacks against high-value victims can be accomplished with greater efficiency, enabled by other malware families such as Emotet/Geodo. These secondary malware families provide an effective attack vector that increases the success of phishing attempts and targeted ransomware campaigns. Emotet—an email-borne Trojan which actors use to install other nefarious tools—has gone offline with no activity since June 2019. If the Trojan were to resurface, we assess that threat actors could rather easily carry out more email ransomware attacks on a broader scope. Without the efficiency provided by Emotet or even a Ransomware-as-a-Service such as GandCrab (which has supposedly shut down permanently), targeted infections continue to be the more lucrative option for ransomware operators.

Recent headlines have drawn attention to exceptionally costly targeted ransomware attacks against local US governments, healthcare services, and the transportation sector. Also spurring great debate: cyber insurance companies are recommending payment of ransom and are directly contributing to those payments as part of their insurance coverage. Taking this into account— along with the hefty price tags associated with the recovery costs of cities who have not elected to pay the ransom, such as Atlanta and Baltimore—Cofense Intelligence™ assesses this could lead to an uptick in ransom payments and further embolden an increase in targeted ransomware campaigns.

Only last week, the cyber insurer of La Porte County in Indiana contributed $100,000 toward an equivalent of $130,000-valued Bitcoin demand. The firm advised La Porte County to pay the threat actors, who infected local networks using the Ryuk ransomware. Similar stories have emerged across the United States. What remains to be seen is how effective recovery is following payment. Often, decryption is not as immediate or successful as ransomware operators would have their victims believe.

Will Cyber Insurance Create New Targets?

It makes sense that organizations seek indemnity to protect their financial portfolios. But while everyday scams or fraud occur in a traditional insurance setting, cyber criminals may look to specifically target insured organizations for a guaranteed return in the future. Cyber insurance companies known to pay out ransom could present a surefire target for actors.

Regardless of targeting potential, all organizations should engage in appropriate planning and preparation with defense technology and user awareness. Threat intelligence will help to ensure that your organization’s defense is as proactive as possible. Educating and enabling your users to identify and report phishing messages ensures preparedness at every line of defense. As an industry leader in phishing defense solutions, CofenseTM provides security professionals with tools and skills to combat email-borne threats, so that you can defend against even those threats that bypass your perimeter technologies and reach user inboxes. Only by stepping up our collective defense will we reduce the efficacy and proliferation of ransomware campaigns for good.

More Ways Cofense Can Help

Cofense IntelligenceTM processes and analyzes millions of emails and malware samples each day, providing a view of emerging phishing and malware threats.

The Cofense Phishing Defense CenterTM identifies active phishing attacks in enterprise environments. Learn how our dedicated experts provide actionable intelligence to stop phishing threats.

Condition end users to be resilient to ransomware and other attacks with Cofense PhishMeTM.  It includes a variety of ransomware templates to help users recognize the threat. Empower users to report phishing emails with one click using Cofense ReporterTM.

Quickly turn user reported emails into actionable intelligence with Cofense TriageTM. Reduce exposure time by rapidly quarantining threats with Cofense VisionTM.

Attackers do their research. Every SaaS platform you use is an opportunity for attackers to exploit it. Understand what SaaS applications are configured for your domains—do YOUR research with Cofense CloudSeeker.

Thanks to our unique perspective, no one knows more about current REAL phishing threats than Cofense. To raise your understanding, read the 2019 Phishing Threat & Malware Review.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

Double Duty: Dridex Banking Malware Delivered with RMS RAT

Cofense IntelligenceTM analyzes millions of emails and malware samples each day to alert organizations to emerging phishing threats. Thanks to our expansive view of the threat landscape, we recently were able to discover and investigate a campaign impersonating eFax that appeared to have an attached Microsoft Word document. The attachment was a .zip archive which contained a .xls Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. This spreadsheet included an Office macro which, when enabled, was used to download and execute two malicious executables: samples of Dridex and Remote Manipulator System Remote Access Tool (RMS RAT).

What’s notable: By delivering a banking trojan and a RAT, the threat actors are able to use the banking trojan purely for credential stealing via browsers and use the RAT for more complex management of the infected computer. Dridex may be able to handle some of the machine management tasks, but by using RMS RAT and Dridex for separate purposes threat actors can more efficiently accomplish their tasks. And having both available provides a backup communication channel in case one of the malware families is detected and removed.

RMS RAT Features

RMS RAT is a legitimate remote access tool appropriated for malicious use by threat actors. RMS RAT has a large number of features that include logging keystrokes, recording from the webcam or microphone, transferring files, and manipulating Windows Task Manager and other Windows utilities. This multi-featured tool allows for significant control of a compromised computer as well as multiple methods of information gathering. Due to its legitimate origins and usage of legitimate components, not all endpoint protection suites will immediately detect this tool as malicious, which allows threat actors more time to establish a foothold in the infrastructure.

Dridex Web Injects

Banking trojans often target a large number of websites and use different kinds of scripts for different targets. Some banking trojans will even share the same scripts and targets with other banking trojans. When a victim on an infected machine visits one of the targeted websites in an internet browser, the script will be “injected” into the browser. This allows the threat actor to steal information entered, redirect traffic, bypass multi-factor authentication, and even provide additional “security questions” to obtain information from the victim. In this case, the web injects used by Dridex were unusual because of both the large number of possible web inject scripts and the fact that some of the web injects were labeled as being from the Zeus banking trojan.

There are three types of web injects used in this case. The first type is used to hide or display content on certain web pages, making it possible to insert additional requests for personal questions used to verify banking accounts. The second type monitors the URLs visited by the browser and downloads additional files; the web injects labeled as Zeus fall in this category. Both of these web injects come hard coded into the original malicious binary. The third type of web inject is downloaded from a remote host and often has more capabilities, including greater information-gathering capacity.

Web injects in this sample of Dridex target a variety of websites:

  • The first set targets crypto currency websites such as coinbase[.]com and banking websites such as hsbc[.]co[.]uk and synovus[.]com. The web injects for these targets are downloaded from the same command and control location, 144[.]76[.]111[.]43.
  • A second set of web injects targets e-commerce websites, including paypal[.]com and bestbuy[.]com, and is sourced from a different location: akamai-static5[.]online. The threat actor’s use of this particular domain name is clever because it is similar enough to an Akamai network domain name that the domain might not be reported because it looks legitimate.
  • The final set of web injects are tagged as “Zeus” injects. The use of these injects is particularly unusual because several of the targeted websites overlap with those in other web injects, such as paypal[.]com and amazon[.]com.

By using multiple types of web injects, and in some cases duplicating websites of other web injects, the threat actors have a wide variety of possible targets at their disposal. Using both old and new web injects can also help threat actors target information even when the structure of the webpages’ URL has changed over time.

Threat Results and a Look Ahead:

The dual-pronged attack in this case provided the threat actors with multiple methods of compromise, access to data, and some resistance to traditional endpoint protections. RMS RAT provided remote access, key logging, and credential stealing. And using different types of web injects enabled threat actors to utilize some of the features of Zeus to improve the capabilities of Dridex. Each different type of web inject also made use of a different command and control location to provide information, which can help make the threat actor’s infrastructure more resilient.

Knowing all of the possible threats in combination rather than those seen individually can help organizations prepare for and defend against threats. Training employees to spot and report possible phishing messages can help stop malware from making it to an endpoint and prevent threat actors from ever establishing a foothold.

Learn More

See how Cofense Intelligence analyzes and processes millions of emails and malware samples daily so security teams can easily consume phishing-specific threat intelligence. Discover how to proactively defend your organization against evolving phishing attacks and the latest malware varieties.

Appendix:

Table 1: List of potential web inject source

Web Inject Sources
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/amex_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/bbt_biz_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/bbt_corp_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/bmo_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/bnycash_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/bremer_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/pnc_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/scotiabank_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/5/tdbank_tdetreasury_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/510/tiquani_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/amama_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/amunba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/atonbu_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/bacana_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/bahaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/bokafi_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/bomobo_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/buliba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/camaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/camaci_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/camana_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/cibaca_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/cobaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/cobuba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/emriba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/ewaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/facosa_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/famaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/finiba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/fumaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/hacaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/hasaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/hasaba_uk_pers_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/iboaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/inruba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/irisoba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/katata_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/lakala_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/lemiba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/madaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/magaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/matawa_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/mecoma_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/moboma_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/osv_cetiba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/osv_fasaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/osv_sabatu_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/osv_tobipu_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/pawaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/peniba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/pocoba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/povaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/rabaca2_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/rabaca_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/rasaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/satara_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/secaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/sigaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/socoba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/synova_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/tadaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/todoba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/ubatra_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/unbaba_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://144[.]76[.]111[.]43:443/520/wabaca_l4R5Ej69o91Bc3ja/
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/appleadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/bestbuyadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/costcoadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/ebayadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/neweggadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/ppadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/samsclubadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://akamai-static5[.]online/walmartadmin/gate[.]php
hxxps://bustheza[.]com/lob[.]php
hxxps://cachejs[.]com/lob[.]php
hxxps://46[.]105[.]131[.]77:443/B88U86giIPyD55RK/
hxxps://46[.]105[.]131[.]77:443/ehf9i7ywh5kdyu50/
hxxps://46[.]105[.]131[.]77:443/xobj6j20x84lhk3x/

Table 2: Command and control hosts (C2)

RMS RAT C2
217[.]12[.]201[.]159:5655
Dridex C2
hxxps://71[.]217[.]15[.]111:443/
hxxps://97[.]76[.]245[.]131:443/
hxxps://24[.]40[.]243[.]66:443/
hxxps://159[.]69[.]89[.]90:3389/
hxxps://159[.]89[.]179[.]87:3389/
hxxps://62[.]210[.]26[.]206:3389/

Table 3: Payload locations

Office Macro Payloads
hxxp://topdalescotty[.]top/filexxx/wiskkk[.]exe
hxxp://topdalescotty[.]top/filexxx/wotam[.]exe

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense™ whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

Houdini Worm Transformed in New Phishing Attack

By Nick Guarino and Aaron Riley

The Cofense Phishing Defense Center™ (PDC)  and Cofense Intelligence have identified a new variant of Houdini Worm targeting commercial banking customers with campaigns containing either URLs, .zip, or .mht files. This new variant is named WSH Remote Access Tool (RAT) by the malware’s author and was released on June 2, 2019. Within five days, WSH RAT was observed being actively distributed via phishing. Figure 1 shows an example message from this campaign.

Using Windows 10? It’s Becoming a Phishing Target

CISO Summary

Cofense IntelligenceTM has recently seen a complex phishing campaign that delivers a simple payload, FormGrabber keylogger malware. The targets are Windows 10 operating systems running Windows Anti-malware Scan Interface (AMSI). The phishing emails deliver a Microsoft Excel Worksheet containing a MS Word macro that initiates infection.

What’s notable: threat actors are hitting Windows 10 instead of Windows 7, a more common target. Expect to see greater abuse heaped on the newer version as more businesses adopt it. No one aspect of this campaign is novel, but the attackers easily assembled a complex infection chain using multiple obfuscation and evasion techniques—another sign of how quickly criminals innovate when motivated.

 Full Details

Cofense Intelligence recently observed a campaign where threat actors targeted Windows 10 operating systems and used a complex multi-stage campaign to deliver the relatively simple FormGrabber keylogger. The emails utilized a Microsoft Office Excel Worksheet with an Office Word macro to initiate the infection. If macros were enabled, this macro would execute a PowerShell script that compiled embedded C# code content into a .NET dll. The .NET dll was loaded as a PowerShell module that then downloaded and executed the FormGrabber keylogger. The code used in the PowerShell module specifically targets Windows 10 computers which have the Windows Anti-malware Scan Interface (AMSI) installed.

Initiation

Each email identified within this campaign had two attachments: the first was a Microsoft Office Excel Worksheet, the second was an RTF document. This RTF document contained five embedded copies of the same Excel Worksheet, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Copies of the same embedded Worksheet object

When the document is opened, the victim is prompted five times (once for each of the embedded worksheets) to enable macros. After all the prompts have been responded to, the RTF document will be opened. The method used to embed the worksheet objects into the RTF document requires that the worksheet objects be displayed in some form or fashion. In most cases, threat actors will carefully attempt to hide the object to avoid tipping off victims. As shown in Figure 2, in this case the threat actors simply let the default primary worksheet display in the footer section of the document.

Figure 2: The image displayed in the footer of the RTF document

Here the threat actors repurposed a legitimate example worksheet from Carnegie Mellon University to hide malicious content. The file size and macro run by the attached and embedded Excel worksheets are different, however the end result and final payload location are the same, indicating that the two attachments were likely used for redundancy.

Worksheets

Automated systems often examine the macros in documents in an attempt to determine their intentions. Even if the macro is encoded or obfuscated, modern anti-virus should be capable of reversing the changes or at least detecting key malicious components without running the macro. The macros in these worksheets used a simple technique that may have allowed the threat actors to avoid some automated defenses, crafting a macro that decoded content stored in a cell on a seemingly empty page of the worksheet, as shown in Figure 3. Note that the macro (one line of which appears at the top of the image) references cell “J106” on sheet “RPNLU.” All cells in sheet “RPNLU” appear to be empty and the default page view has cell “J106” out of view, ensuring that even if manually opened, the only obvious discrepancy between the original legitimate worksheet and the malicious one is the addition of the sheet “RPNLU.”

Figure 3: Disguised data used by macro (top of image)

Once decrypted, this macro then launches a PowerShell process which contains another subsection of encrypted data, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Second stage of the PowerShell script

This PowerShell command takes the encrypted content and decrypts it into C# code, which is then compiled into a .NET dll and loaded as a PowerShell module.

Bypassing

The compilation and multiple layers of encryption involved in this process are all used to “bypass” AMSI. AMSI is a Windows 10 exclusive feature intended to help detect and prevent scripts and “fileless threats.” In order to “bypass” AMSI, the threat actors avoid downloading files and perform other obviously malicious activity in the code that runs in the PowerShell console. Instead they focus only on disabling AMSI by adjusting where it looks for malicious content. The code used for this is similar and almost identical in some places to the proof of concept described in this blog post. Once AMSI is properly disabled, the threat actors then load in the C# code including the explicitly malicious code compiled in a .NET dll as a PowerShell module. A relevant portion of this code can be seen in Figure 5.

Figure 5: A modified version of the original POC code to bypass AMSI

Results and a Look Ahead

Threat actors used a complex infection chain that specifically targeted a key component of Windows 10 operating systems, rather than the more common Windows 7-focused malware, to deliver FormGrabber keylogger. As more businesses switch to the Windows 10 operating system, threat actors, like the ones seen here, can be expected to switch their targets to Windows 10 as well. Although none of the techniques used in this campaign were particularly novel, the fact that it utilized multiple obfuscation and evasion techniques and was so easily assembled from already created work indicates how quickly and significantly threat actors can improve, given the proper impetus. As is usually the case when it comes to vulnerabilities in key components, a patch to prevent this method of AMSI bypass exists. However, businesses first need to be aware of the problem. Knowledge of the evolving threat landscape and the different ways that it can affect a company are key to promoting a secure environment. To improve your security posture, take preventative action by patching systems and training employees to recognize and prevent the first stage in an infection chain.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

Patch or Pass? CVE-2017-11882 Is a Security Conundrum

CISO Summary

Since the latter part of 2018, threat actors have increasingly exploited two Microsoft vulnerabilities: CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802. The first of these is especially popular. Cofense IntelligenceTM has seen it surge ahead of Microsoft macros as a favorite malware delivery method.

CVE-2017-11882 is an older vulnerability that in fact has a patch. However, it presents a conundrum for security teams that haven’t addressed the problem. They can choose to skip the patching, live with the risks, and keep on using the legacy program. Or they can update, patch, and lose the application entirely to gain much better security.

In the meantime, threat actors will happily exploit every chance they get.

Full Details

The vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Equation Editor that are exploited in CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802 have been “patched” for over a year. However, these vulnerabilities remain popular with threat actors and have become increasingly common since their inception. There are several factors involved, but Cofense Intelligence assesses that CVE-2017-11882 is still commonly used simply because it works, reaffirming the challenges associated with patching and the risks of operating legacy platforms. CVE-2017-11882 still works as a delivery mechanism on unpatched or unsupported versions of Microsoft Office and is most commonly used to deliver simple information stealers.

The Progression

In September 2018, Cofense Intelligence covered the most common malware delivery methods and highlighted Microsoft Office macros as making up the majority of the most common malware delivery methods. Over the last six months, we have observed a sharp increase in the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882.

The threat actors who switched to using CVE-2017-11882 as their primary delivery method focused significantly on information stealers, such as Loki Bot and AZORult, which make up 33% and 16% of the malware delivered respectively. In contrast, the most common Remote Access Trojan (RAT) is NanoCore RAT, which is the fifth most frequently malware delivered at only 7%.

Figure 1: Frequency of malware family delivered by CVE-2017-11882

But You Said There is a Patch!

Cofense Intelligence assesses that the most common reason CVE-2017-11882 still works for threat actors is that the patches intended to remedy it simply are not in place on several endpoints. Rather than assuming that support teams are incompetent, given that over a year has passed since the first patch, it is more likely that companies are being faced with a product support conundrum.

Businesses must choose between two options. The first is accepting a level of risk and continuing to use legacy programs by not patching. The second is to update, patch, and in this case, allow the removal of an application entirely in order to have significantly higher security. This is much easier for large businesses with great resources to devote to upgrades and security. For smaller businesses—including boutique subsidiaries of major businesses—this is much more difficult. Again, given the amount of time that has passed, it is unlikely at this point that anybody who has not yet updated will do so any time soon, allowing threat actors continued access.

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All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

Pretty Pictures Sometimes Disguise Ugly Executables

CISO Summary

Reaching deep into their bag of tricks to avoid detection, threat actors are using an oldie but goodie— packing image files (think tropical beach scenes) with malicious executables, usually a .jpg. The technique allows attackers to avoid detection by some anti-virus programs that merely recognize a file as an image, but don’t check its full contents.

This vintage tactic works—threat actors still use it a lot. Anti-virus systems rely on file headers to detect malware. Tuning systems to rely less on file headers is difficult and sometimes impossible. One counter-measure that does work: educate employees not to fall for phishing emails and encourage them to report any they find suspicious.

Full Details

Cofense Intelligence™ has been tracking the ongoing usage of image files to disguise malicious executables, a technique that can easily bypass network security measures. Threat actors will use a first stage malware downloader to retrieve an image file, most often a .jpg. The malware downloader then extracts a malicious executable that is embedded within the image. Finally, the malware runs the extracted binary in memory to avoid dropping an additional executable to disk. By using this technique to download the second binary, threat actors are able to avoid detection by some anti-virus (AV) programs that can determine the downloaded file to be an image but do not check the rest of the file contents.

Delivery

The malware downloader often used to deliver these types of files is an executable using the .NET framework. From May 2018 to April 2019, Cofense Intelligence saw images with embedded executables comprising more than 70% of the binaries downloaded by .NET executables. The images can be anything from famous actors to server rooms, but one of the more common ones can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Commonly seen image

The images used not only display correctly but often have additional “metadata,” an example of which can be seen in Figure 2. This metadata is not present in all cases and may be an artifact from the original image before it was modified.

Figure 2: Additional meta data included in the image

Contents

The downloaded files are treated as images because of their file header and to a lesser degree, their file extension. File headers help the operating system determine how to interpret the contents of the file and can indicate several factors, such as whether a file is an image or an executable. Figure 3 illustrates that images with the .jpg extension, also known as JPEG images, will have the characters “JFIF” near the start of the file.

Figure 3: JPEG image file header

This header is also used by most AVs to determine the file type, as it is much more reliable than a file extension. When a “JFIF” header is read by most AVs the rest of the file will be ignored as long as the image is not broken or incomplete. The subterfuge of using an image file header also enables threat actors to bypass most network security measures which, like local AV, will treat the file as an image and ignore its content. By including an image that will properly display, threat actors are able to satisfy all of the conditions required for their malicious content to be ignored by security measures and “safely” delivered to the endpoint. This also ensures that if a file is manually downloaded and opened it will appear legitimate to the end user.

Extracting

Creating an image file that meets these requirements also ensures that the operating system does not recognize the file as an executable and will not execute the file, regardless of the program used to open it. This fact requires a downloader, such as a .NET executable, to “extract” the malicious executable from the image file. This can be easily done by searching the file contents for the file header representing an executable, “MZ,” as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Embedded executable header

Once this header is found, the executable content is carved out and loaded into memory rather than executing a file dropped to disk. Because the content is executed in memory rather than from an actual executable file, it is less likely to be recognized by AV as malicious. Most AV solutions do not monitor the memory of a process already running, which allows the malware to perform most of its activities without being noticed.

Staging

The fact that both a downloader and an image file are required to complete the infection is an important part of the infection strategy. If an image file is run by itself in an automated environment, it will simply display an image, with the only possibility of detection relying on the image file content having suspicious text. If only the downloader is executed and the image payload is unavailable, then it may be detected as suspicious, but on its own would not provide defenders with enough information to fully combat the threat. This requirement of having both stages together helps hide from defenders using automated analysis systems that are focused on individual files.

Why It Matters

Although not a new technique, the consistent popularity and utility of this approach to malware delivery merits attention. Threat actors abuse of operating system and AV reliance on file header recognition has been and will continue to be a problem. An example of threat actors abusing this reliance to trick AV systems as well as analysts was also recently covered by CofenseTM. Tuning AV systems to detect malware without relying on file headers is difficult and, in some cases, impossible. To properly recognize threats, it is important to have a full picture of the different components involved in an attack rather than attempting to organize individual and possibly incomplete analysis. To avoid this pitfall and better protect their network environments, organizations need to ensure that employees are trained to not fall victim to the phishing emails and that defenders are ready should an incident happen.

To stay ahead of emerging phishing and malware trends, sign up for free Cofense™ Threat Alerts.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.