Trickbot Is Using Google Docs to Trick Proofpoint’s Gateway

By Tej Tulachan

The Cofense Phishing Defense Center (PDC) has detected a phishing campaign that delivers Trickbot embedded in a Google Docs link. Trickbot has been making the rounds for a long time now and is still considered one of the biggest malware threats targeting business today. Threat actors frequently utilize legitimate applications or trusted file sharing sites like Google Docs to bypass the email gateway and lure users to click on the link to deliver malware. In this case, the email made it through Proofpoint’s gateway utilized by our PDC customer.

Email Body

The email attempts to lure curious users to click on the link: “Have you already received documentation I’ve directed you recently? I am sending them over again.” This is a legitimately generated email by Google Docs when a file is shared by one of its subscribers. Unknowingly, the recipient is directed to a document hosted on Google that contains a malicious URL.

Fig 1. Email body

When the recipient clicks on the link it directs to a genuine Google Docs page as shown below, which contains a fake 404 error message and another embedded link. The threat actor baits the recipient into downloading the document: “Downloading the document manually via the link”. This link hxxps://docs[.]google[.]com/uc?id=112QLCdDtd4y-mAzr8hobCs0TP5mQmKfL downloads the malicious payload.

Fig 2. Google doc page

Once the URL links to a file hosted on Google drive, it downloads a Review_Rep.19.PDF.exe which has been disguised as PDF file. Many recipients will not see the .exe file extension. It’s something that you need to specifically enable in Windows. So, to them it looks like a legitimate PDF file since the attacker uses the icon for a PDF.

Fig 3. Pdf Icon

If we look at the file in a hex editor, we see that in fact it’s an executable file and not a PDF.

Take a look below in the editor, indicated by the magic bytes MZ which denotes a windows executable.

Fig 4. Magic Number

Once the payload is executed it creates a copy of itself (egолаСывЯыФЙ) in C:\ProgramData, where it  undertakes control over execution of the malware.

Fig 5. egолаСывЯыФЙ.exe

Furthermore, it creates another copy in “C:\Users\REM\AppData\Roaming\speedLan” that also includes the config file for Trickbot (settings.ini) (The directory depends on the Trickbot version.)

Fig 6. speedlan

If we look inside the settings.ini we see a lot of the “obfuscated” text.

Fig 7. Obfuscated text

Additionally, if we open up the Task Scheduler, we can see it also sets a task that starts the malicious file from the “Speedlan” folder.

Fig 8. Start Task Scheduler

Looking at the Triggers tab, we can see it has been set to repeat itself every 11 minutes for 596843 minutes (414 days) for this particular version of Trickbot. The scheduled task checks to see if the binary is running in memory every 11 minutes over a 1-year period. This means that the binary will stay persistent on the system if the process is terminated. The 414 day counter just insures that the scheduled task stays running for as long as the system is online (generally, people will reboot their computer at least once a year).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fig 9. Trigger

This then hollows out Svchost, injects its malicious code, and launches it. It keeps launching more and more Svchost’s if you let it run. Each of these are typically responsible for a module of Trickbot.

Fig 10. Hollows Svchost

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

Malicious File(s):

 

Filename: Review_ Rep.19.PDF.exe

MD5: ab2a8fc10e8c1a39ae816734db9480de

SHA-256: 20328b1f169b1edeef38853dafbbacfdac53c66f7f1dd62f387091bedebfd497

File Size: 404,320 Bytes

Extension: exe

 

Malicious URL(s):

 

hxxps://docs[.]google[.]com/document/d/1fgSfd4DwReVKbcLI3ISO2jhX1Yn8WOqbXnmU_bg00_A/edit?usp=sharing_eip&ts=5d5accb1
hxxps://docs[.]google[.]com/uc?id=112QLCdDtd4y-mAzr8hobCs0TP5mQmKfL
hxxps://jaquetas01[.]cordenadorltda[.]org
hxxps://services[.]halapar[.]org

 

Associated IP(s):

200[.]119[.]45[.]140

107[.]181[.]175[.]122

79[.]143[.]31[.]94

198[.]27[.]74[.]146

186[.]47[.]40[.]234

181[.]129[.]93[.]226

190[.]152[.]4[.]210

 

HOW COFENSE CAN HELP

89% of phishing threats delivering malware payloads analyzed by the Cofense Phishing Defense CenterTM bypassed email gateways. Condition users to be resilient to evolving phishing attacks with Cofense PhishMeTM and remove the blind spot with Cofense ReporterTM. Cofense PhishMe offers a phishing scenario, “Shared Google Doc – TrickBot,” to help users identify the attack described in today’s blog.

Quickly turn user reported emails into actionable intelligence with Cofense TriageTM. Reduce exposure time by rapidly quarantining threats with Cofense VisionTM.

Easily consume phishing-specific threat intelligence to proactively defend your organisation against evolving threats with Cofense IntelligenceTM.

Thanks to our unique perspective, no one knows more about REAL phishing threats than Cofense™. To understand them better, read the 2019 Phishing Threat & Malware Review.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks. Any observations contained in this blog regarding circumvention of end point protections are based on observations at a point in time based on a specific set of system configurations. Subsequent updates or different configurations may be effective at stopping these or similar threats.

Phishing Attackers Are Abusing WeTransfer to Evade Email Gateways

By Jake Longden

The Cofense Phishing Defense Center has observed a wave of phishing attacks that utilize the legitimate file hosting site WeTransfer to deliver malicious URLs to bypass email gateways. The attacks span major industries like banking, power, and media. Here’s how they work.

Email Body:

The email body is a genuine notification from WeTransfer which informs the victim that a file has been shared with them. The attackers utilise what appears to be compromised email accounts to send a genuine link to a WeTransfer hosted file. As these are legitimate links from WeTransfer, this allows them to travel straight through security checks at the gateway.

WeTransfer allows for the addition of a note to the email to clarify why the file was sent. Here, the threat actor will often write a note stating that the file is an invoice to be reviewed. This is a commonly observed phishing technique to pique the user’s interest.

Fig 1. Email body

Phishing Page:

When the user clicks on the “Get your files” button in the message body, the user is redirected to the WeTransfer download page where a HTM or HTML file is hosted and thus downloaded by the unsuspecting victim. When the user opens the .html file, he or she is redirected to the main phishing page.

Fig 2. WeTransfer Hosted file

In the final stage of the attack, victims are asked to enter their Office365 credentials to login. More often than not, we see a Microsoft Service being targeted, however we have observed other targeted brands.

Fig 3. Phishing Page

Gateway Evasion

As WeTransfer is a well-known and trusted file hosting system, used to share files too large to attach to an email, these links will typically bypass gateways as benign emails, unless settings are modified to restrict access to such file sharing sites. The PDC has observed this attack method to bypass multiple gateways. These include ProofPoint, Office365 Safe Links,  and Symantec.

Useful Resources for Customers

Description
Triage Yara rule: PM_WeTransfer_File_Download
PhishMe Templates: “File Transfer”
Cofense Intelligence: https://www.threathq.com/p42/search/default#m=26412&type=renderThreat 


Other Ways Cofense Can Help

The Cofense Phishing Defense Center identifies active phishing attacks in enterprise environments. Learn how our dedicated experts provide actionable intelligence to stop phishing threats.

75% of threats reported to the Cofense Phishing Defense Center are credential phish. Protect the keys to your kingdom—condition end users to be resilient to credential harvesting attacks with Cofense PhishMeTM.  Our solution offers a phishing simulation to protect against file-transfer attacks like the one described in this blog.

According to the Cofense Phishing Defense Center, over 91% of the credential harvesting attacks they identify bypassed email gateways. Remove the blind spot—get visibility of attacks with Cofense ReporterTM.

Quickly turn user reported emails into actionable intelligence with Cofense TriageTM. Reduce exposure time by rapidly quarantining threats with Cofense VisionTM.

Attackers do their research. Every SaaS platform you use is an opportunity for attackers to exploit it. Understand what SaaS applications are configured for your domains—do YOUR research with Cofense CloudSeeker.

Thanks to our unique perspective, no one knows more about current REAL phishing threats than Cofense. To raise your understand, read the 2019 Phishing Threat & Malware Review.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

This Phishing Attacker Takes American Express—and Victims’ Credentials

Recently, the CofenseTM Phishing Defense CenterTM observed a phishing attack against American Express customers, both merchant and corporate card holders. Seeking to harvest account credentials, the phishing emails use a relatively new exploit to bypass conventional email gateway URL filtering services.

UK Banking Phish Targets 2-Factor Information

Recently, the Cofense Phishing Defense Center observed a wave of phishing attacks  targeting TSB banking customers in the UK. We found these consumer-oriented phishing emails in corporate environments, after the malicious messages made it past perimeter defenses.

The convincing emails aimed to harvest an unsuspecting victim’s email, password, mobile numbers, and the “memorable information” used in two-factor authentication. If someone were to bite on the phish, they would be open to follow-up phone scams or the complete takeover of their bank account and credit cards.

Most UK banks implement two-factor authentication. They require users to set a standard password and a piece of memorable information, which users authenticate with their user name and password. Users are then asked to provide three random characters from their memorable information. This does two things to help improve the security of your bank account:

  1. It can help mitigate against man in the middle attacks, as any intercepted data would only reveal partial fragments of the memorable information.
  2. If a user’s email address and password combination has been leaked online, it provides an extra barrier for attackers attempting to access their accounts.

Again, if successful this phish could help the attacker evade these extra controls. Here’s how it works:

Email Body:

The attacks begins with an email purporting to be from the TSB customer care team, informing the customer that a new “SSL server” has been implemented to prevent access to customer accounts by third parties. It then asks the user to update their account information by clicking on the conveniently placed hyperlink.

Fig 1. Phishing Email

Headers:

To add authenticity to the attack, the threat actors have spoofed the sending information to make the email appear to come from the sender customercare[@]tsb[.]co[.]uk If we correlate this with the message ID, we can see that it actually originated from the ttrvidros[.]com[.]br a Brazilian registered domain.

From: TSB Bank <customercare[@]tsb[.]co[.]uk>
To: "MR, Example" <example@cofense.com>
Subject: EXTERNAL: Account Update Notice
Thread-Topic: EXTERNAL: Account Update Notice
Thread-Index: AQHVJzUy0rKRdi+45UWU8FPBrgSqiQ==
X-MS-Exchange-MessageSentRepresentingType: 1
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 06:55:28 +0000
Message-ID: <5630c1ff905b65891e435ec91b8a1390[@]www[.]ttrvidros[.]com[.]br>
Content-Language: en-GB

Fig 2. Header Information

Phishing Page:

The malicious page shown below on fig3 is almost identical to TSB online banking portal. The first page is directed to ask for a User ID and password.

Fig 3. Phishing Page 1

The victim is then asked to supply characters from their memorable information. This is typically a word that is memorable to the user and six characters or longer, usually a pet’s name, mother’s maiden name, or a favorite city or sports team. It is standard practice to only provide three characters of your memorable information. However, this is just a clever ruse to gain the confidence of the victim.

Fig 4. Phishing Page 2

The user is then redirected to a fake error page that states, “There is a problem with some of the information you have submitted. Please amend the fields below and resubmit this form.” Afterward, the form asks the victim for the full memorable information and the mobile phone number. Armed with the victim’s user-ID, password, memorable information, and phone number an attacker can easily gain access to the victim’s bank account and credit cards through the online portal—or perhaps more worryingly, they can utilize this information to launch a social engineering campaign over the phone, commonly referred to as vishing (Voice Phishing).

Fig 5. Phishing page 3

Gateway Evasion:

This threat was found in an environment running Microsoft Exchange Online Protection (EOP) which provides built-in malware and spam filtering capabilities it is intended to screen inbound and outbound messages from malicious software spam transferred through email. 

Learn More

75% of threats reported to the Cofense Phishing Defense Center are credential phish. Protect the keys to your kingdom—condition end users to be resilient to credential harvesting attacks with Cofense PhishMe™, which among many training scenarios offers an “Account Update Notice” phish to prepare for the type of credential attack examined in this blog post.

Over 91% of credential harvesting attacks bypassed secure email gateways. Remove the blind spot—get visibility of attacks with Cofense Reporter™.

Quickly turn user reported emails into actionable intelligence with Cofense Triage™. Reduce exposure time by rapidly quarantining threats with Cofense Vision™.

Attackers do their research. Every SaaS platform you use is an opportunity for attackers to exploit it. Understand what SaaS applications are configured for your domains—do YOUR research with Cofense CloudSeeker™.

Thanks to our unique perspective, no one knows more about the current REAL phishing threat than Cofense™. To improve your understanding, read the 2019 Phishing Threat & Malware Review.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

Under the Radar – Phishing Using QR Codes to Evade URL Analysis

Phishing attacks evolve over time, and attacker frustration with technical controls is a key driver in the evolution of phishing tactics.

In today’s modern enterprise, it’s not uncommon for our emails to run the gauntlet of security products that wrap or scan embedded URLs with the hope of finding that malicious link. Products like Proofpoint URL Defense, Microsoft Safe Links, and Mimecast URL Protect hope to prevent phishing attacks by wrapping or analyzing URLs.  These technologies can only be effective IF they can find the URLs in the first place.

Fast forward to this week where our Phishing Defense Center™ stopped a phishing campaign aimed at customers in Finance. The analysis below outlines the attacker’s use of a URL encoded in a QR code to evade the above-named technologies.  While you’ve probably seen QR codes in your everyday life, this might be the first time you are seeing QR codes used as a phishing tactic.

The Phish:

The email itself is relatively simple. It poses as a pseudo SharePoint email with the subject line: “Review Important Document”. The message body invites the victim to: “Scan Bar Code To View Document”. The only other visible content is a tantalizing QR code that a curious user may be tempted to scan.

Figure 1, Email Body

The message body in plain text consists of several basic HTML elements for styling and an embedded .gif image file of the QR code. Very basic, but very effective.

When the QR code is decoded we can see that that it contains a phishing URL: hxxps://digitizeyourart.whitmers[.]com/wp-content/plugins/wp-college/Sharepoint/sharepoint/index.php

Most smartphone QR code scanner apps will instantly redirect the user to the malicious website via the phone’s native browser. In this case the victim would be redirected to a SharePoint branded phishing site. The victim is then confronted with options to sign in with AOL, Microsoft, or “Other” account services. While this sounds like a simple phish, there is a more nefarious tactic in play: removing the user from the security of a corporate business network.

Figure 2, Phishing site

Standard Security Controls Circumvented:

By enticing the victim to pull out their smartphone and scan the QR code the attacker manages to evade standard corporate security controls. Secure email gateways, link protection services, sandboxes, and web content filters no longer matter because the user is now interacting with the phishing site in their own security space: their mobile phone. And yes, the phishing site is optimized for mobile viewing. Here’s a glance at what the site looks like on a smartphone:

Figure 3, Phishing page viewed on phone

Though the user may now be using their personal device to access the phish, they are still in the “corporate” mindset as the original email was received at their business email address. Therefore, it is highly likely that the victim would input their corporate account credentials to attempt to access this “document”. 

Gateway Evasion:

This attack was observed passing through an environment utilizing Symantec Messaging Gateway. When scanned, the message was deemed “Not spam” by the system as seen in Fig 4 below.

Figure 4, Email Header Snippet

Conclusion:

In the past QR codes were reserved for geeks on the bleeding edge of technology. Today we interact with QR codes more and more as we cut the cord on cable, setup home internet devices, transact crypto currencies, etc…  Will QR codes be a common phishing tactic of the future? Time will tell.  But THIS phishing attack that snuck past best in class phishing technologies was only stopped by an informed, in tune human, who reported it with Cofense Reporter ™ , so that their security teams could stop it.

Today over 90% of phishing threats observed by the Cofense Phishing Defense Center ™ bypassed secure email gateways. Condition users to be resilient to evolving phishing attacks with Cofense PhishMe ™ and remove the blind spot with Cofense Reporter.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

Phishing Attacks on High Street Target Major Retailer

By Jake Longden

The Cofense Phishing Defense Center™ has observed a phishing campaign that purports to be from Argos, a major retailer in the UK and British High Street. During 2018, Argos was the subject of a large number of widely reported phishing scamsi; this threat specifically targets Argos customers for their personal information and looks like a continuation of what was seen last year.

With the goal of stealing your store credit card and login information, here’s how it works:

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense™ whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

Fig 1. Email Body

Email Body:

The message itself follows a standard phishing template to inform the user that their account has been restricted and that user sign in is required for verification. The use of bad grammar and typos are a dead giveaway that this email communication is not genuine.

Message body in plain text:

In reviewing the body of the email, we see the hyperlink for “Sign into your account” which directs the potential victim to: hxxps://www[.]argos[.]co[.]uk[.]theninja[.]gknu[.]com/www[.]argos[.]co[.]uk/account-login/

The attacker repeatedly used the string of the legitimate Argos site in the URL, both as part of the subdomains, and as a subdirectory. This was an attempt to mask the true source, and to lure the victim into trusting the legitimacy of the website.

Upon examination, we see that the link is wrapped by a URL filtering service.

href="hxxps://clicktime[.]symantec[.]com/3AuyExDNpRSjkQbgT2gXygH6H2?u=hxxps://www[.]argos[.]co[.]uk[.]theninja[.]gknu[.]com/www[.]argos[.]co[.]uk/account-login/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="ox-dad7652f0e-m_609589041267919212link-blue ox-dad7652f0e-m_609589041267919212MsoHyperlink ox-dad7652f0e-m_609589041267919212MsoHyperlinkFollowed">SIGN
INTO YOUR ACCOUNT

Fig 2. Email Body in Plain Text

 

Email Headers:

Analysis of the headers indicates that the “from” address is spoofed; the “reply to” field contains the address ‘no-reply[@]creativenepal[.]org’, which does not match ‘no-replays[@]multitravel.wisata-islam[.]com’.

Research on the ‘multitravel.wisata-islam’ domain failed to produce relevant data and reinforces the suspicion that the address is spoofed. At the time of analysis, we were unable to resolve an IP address, or load the domain.

From: <no-replays[@]multitravel[.]wisata-islam[.]com>
To: <xxxx.xxxxxx@xxxxxx.com>
Subject: [WARNING SUSPECTED SPAM]  [WARNING SUSPECTED SPAM]  Please make sure
 you complete the form correctly.
Thread-Topic: [WARNING SUSPECTED SPAM]  [WARNING SUSPECTED SPAM]  Please make
 sure you complete the form correctly.
Thread-Index: AQHVIXUk7CjiCOKjHEyntcvh4etMFg==
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 23:18:17 +0000
Message-ID: <7d885f411da93272271ec8ad32e5064b@localhost.localdomain>
Reply-To: <“:no-reply”[@]creativenepal[.]org>

Fig 3. Email Headers

Phishing Page:

Once the user clicks on the “Sign into your account” hyperlink, they are redirected to a convincing imitation of the true Argos login page requesting the victims’ Username and Password.

This then leads the user to a second page, where the user is requested to supply details for their Argos store credit card account. This page follows the standard format for regular credit/debit cards with one key difference: the additional request for a ‘Card Amount’. This request is specific to the Argos Card as referenced in the copy: “The Argos Card lets you shop at Argos, with flexible payment plans that give you longer to pay” (see: https://www.argos.co.uk/help/argos-card/apply). This deviates from standard forms by asking the user for their credit limit.

 

 

Fig 4. Phishing Page

Gateway Evasion:

This campaign has been observed to pass through the ‘Symantec Messaging Gateway’.

We can see the influence of the Email gateway which injected ‘Warning Suspected Spam’ headers to the Subject Line and incorrectly presented this phish as a benign marketing email, and not a phishing attempt.

Conclusion:

To help protect against this type of credential phish, Cofense PhishMe™ offers a template called “Account Limitation.”

This credential phish eluded gateways and was actually mis-identified as harmless marketing spam. In fact 75% of threats reported to the Cofense Phishing Defense Center are Credential Phish. Protect the keys to your kingdom – condition end users to be resilient to Credential Harvesting attacks with Cofense PhishMe.

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense™ whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.

i Google Search “Argos Data Breach 2018”

Houdini Worm Transformed in New Phishing Attack

By Nick Guarino and Aaron Riley

The Cofense Phishing Defense Center™ (PDC)  and Cofense Intelligence have identified a new variant of Houdini Worm targeting commercial banking customers with campaigns containing either URLs, .zip, or .mht files. This new variant is named WSH Remote Access Tool (RAT) by the malware’s author and was released on June 2, 2019. Within five days, WSH RAT was observed being actively distributed via phishing. Figure 1 shows an example message from this campaign.

This ‘Voice Mail’ Is a Phish—and an Email Gateway Fail

By Milo Salvia and Kamlesh Patel

The Cofense Phishing Defense CenterTM has observed a phishing campaign that masquerades as a voicemail message from a well-known company. The goal is to steal your domain credentials by mimicking the Outlook Web App (OWA). 

Email Body: 

The message body is designed to mimic your typical VOIP missed call message delivered via email when a user misses a call. A simple HTML box appears with a blue hyperlink, Play Voice. One would assume it was meant to say Play Message or Play Voice Message. This could indicate that English is not the threat actor’s first language and the original message was mistranslated. It’s the first indicator that something is not quite right about this message. 

Fig 1. Email Body

Message body in HTML:  

If you look at the message body in HTML, you can see that the embedded hyperlink redirects to www[.]lkjhyb[.]com_dg[.]php=”. As you can tell, the URL has been wrapped by a URL filtering service. 

 

<Div align=”center” style=”text-align: center;”> 

<a href=”hxxps://urldefense[.]proofpoint[.]com/v2/url?u=hxxps-3A__www[.]lkjhyb[.]com_dg[.]php=“>Play Voice</a></div> 

</span></font></div>* 

 

Fig 2. Email Body in Plain Text  

Email Headers: 

A closer look at the header information reveals that the threat originates from the domain “protogonay.com. Further research into this domain suggests that it could be a throwaway domain—no company or website can be found that is directly linked to the name 

ext-caller108[@]progonay[.]com.” The threat source itself uses ext-caller108 to add legitimacy to the voicemail ruse. 

** From: Voice Ext <ext-caller108[@]progonay[.]com> 

To: <dxxx.mxxx@axxxx.com> 

Subject: Voice call from ******* (39 seconds) 

Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 08:23:33 -0700 

Message-ID: <20190522082333.8F2288151F642334@progonay.com> 

Content-Type: text/html; charset=”iso-8859-1″ 

X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-05-22_08:,, 

 signatures=0 

X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=1 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 

 suspectscore=2 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=1 clxscore=-94 

 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=1 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=206 adultscore=0 

Fig 3. Email Headers

Phishing Page:  

Once the user clicks on the “Play Voice (sic)” hyperlink, it redirects to what looks like the default corporate Outlook Web App (OWA) login page. This page is designed to steal your O365 domain credentials. As we can see, it asks the victim to supply domain/username:  and password.  

Fig 4. Phishing Page 

Gateway Present:  

This threat was found in an environment running Proofpoint Email Gateway and URL filter. 

Conclusion:  

Threat actors pull out the stops to deliver malicious messages to users’ inboxes. This “voice mail” message is yet another creative example.  

To help protect against this type of credential phish, Cofense PhishMeTM offers a template called “Play Voice Message.” 

Learn more about evolving phishing tactics and techniques—view the Cofense Phishing Threat and Malware Review 2019. 

 

All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.  

The Zombie Phish Is Back with a Vengeance

Keep a close on your inboxes—the Zombie Phish is back and it’s hitting hard.

Last October, on the eve of Halloween, the CofenseTM Phishing Defense CenterTM reported on a new phishing threat dubbed the Zombie Phish. This phish spreads much like a traditional worm. Once a mailbox’s credentials have been compromised, the bot will reply to long-dead emails (hence, Zombie) in the inbox of the infected account, sending a generic phishing email intended to harvest more victims for the Zombie hoard.